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The LORD God then asked the woman: What is this you have done? The woman
answered, “The snake tricked me, so I ate it.” Then the LORD God said to the snake:
Because you have done this, cursed are you among all the animals, tame or wild; On
your belly you shall crawl, and dust you shall eat all the days of your life. I will put enmity
between you and the woman, and between your offspring and hers; They will strike at
your head, while you strike at their heel. To the woman he said: I will intensify your toil in
childbearing; in pain you shall bring forth children. Yet your urge shall be for your
husband, and he shall rule over you. To the man he said: Because you listened to your
wife and ate from the tree about which I commanded you, You shall not eat from it,
Cursed is the ground because of you! In toil you shall eat its yield all the days of your
life. Thorns and thistles it shall bear for you, and you shall eat the grass of the field. By
the sweat of your brow you shall eat bread, Until you return to the ground, from which
you were taken; For you are dust, and to dust you shall return. The man gave his wife
the name “Eve,” because she was the mother of all the living (Genesis 3:13-19).

Chapter One: Introduction

In the Biblical account of creation, we read that there is a particular consequence of the
transgression of Adam and Eve, in that henceforth childbearing would be for all women the
occasion of intense pain (cf. Gen 3:16a). Procreation has not only been a source of tremendous
suffering for women, but maternity—both the physical vulnerability it causes and the shame of
barrenness when she is not fruitful—has stood as the justification for disparaging and
marginalizing women through much of history, revealing the multilayered truth of the text. Only
through the revelation of redemption in Christ, which itself began with a pregnancy, did this
specific task begin to be properly understood. Beyond the value that motherhood adds to the
family and wider community, the Church teaches that there are particular graces attached to it,
for Paul writes in his first letter to Timothy that despite the great tribulations concomitant with
childbearing, the woman can be saved through it (cf. 1 Timothy 2:13-15). Since both men and
women are made in the divine image, with each bearing a rational soul, and the Catholic
understanding of redemption requires that persons respond freely to the gift of grace, motherhood as a response to that invitation must manifest the rational nature of woman in some form.
In this regard, I hereby ask “How is motherhood rational?”
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To answer the question, I will ground this work in the theology and metaphysics of Thomas
Aquinas, which rests on his explanation that both men and women are hylemorphic creatures—
composed of rational soul and material body. Although the Judeo-Christian account allows that
the human person has a nature wounded by sin, Aquinas is clear in showing that the underlying
nature is not destroyed, rather the rational soul allows a person to perceive his supernatural end
as a proper finalisation and fulfillment of his natural inclinations.
This paper will engage three different views, each suggesting that women’s rationality differs
from that of men, and I argue that, primarily, at the heart of each of these errors is a toxic mindbody duality that undermines the human integration that Christ came to reveal. But an additional
problem with each of their views is a truncated and one-dimensional understanding of rationality
that incorporates neither natural law at its foundation nor wisdom as its broadest extension.
Ultimately, I conclude that broadenting rationality to include both has profoundly impacted and
enriched the Church’s understanding of motherhood, thanks to Aquinas.
The three interlocutors—being only a fraction of the myriad approaches to motherhood as an
option for women—were chosen for how they represent a perfect triad of opposing views, with
disparate points of overlap grounded in entirely different mindsets. In response, I will show how
Thomas’s application of Aristotelian principles will restore a proper view of the body in light of
our supernatural end. Specifically, I will outline how a rational soul first informs the body, and
then orders and perfects human actions. Given a proper hylemorphic understanding of the
human person, I will show specifically how motherhood is rational, and that the subjectivity of
the mother is never lost—rather that she is engaging in an act that has the potential not only to
perfect herself, but also to positively influence the common good—with the Virgin Mary standing
as the most perfect example.
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Some men are mad enough to suppose that even a woman can offer them an insult.
What matters is how they regard her, how many lackeys she has for her litter, how
heavily weighted her ears, how roomy her sedan? She is just the same unthinking
creature—wild and unrestrained in her passions—unless she has gained knowledge and
had much instruction.1
Chapter Two: A Brief Overview of Ancient Theories of Female Rationality
Before looking at how various feminists and some traditional Catholics relate reason to women,
it will be helpful to consider briefly how the perceived differences between men and women
impacted ancient civilisations. Since details related to human reproduction illuminated the key
distinction between the sexes, and because generation was essential to the health and wellbeing of a culture, a major theme among religions was the association of women with fertility
cults. Some of the fertility goddesses included Freyja in Norse mythology, the Greek goddess
Demeter, Asherah (mother of the Canaanite god Baal), and Lakshmi, who was revered by
Hindus, Buddhists, and Jains.2 In recognising that fertility rites were meant to produce both
healthy children and abundant crops, whether the woman’s fertility was a source of power over
man or a cause of her subjection mattered less than the fact that her biological capacity to bear
new life allowed for a one-dimensional view of femininity.
As the interactions among Greek gods and goddesses became more psychologically complex,
fertility alone was downplayed and sophisticated storylines prevailed. Philosopher Genevieve
Lloyd reminds us that these divine personalities were less a product of revelation than an
inspired projection of the myriad characteristics discerned among contemporary men and
women, among whom divine beings were thought to interact regularly. Thus, as the Greek
religious construct moved away from the simplistic power of former fertility cults, Euripides, in
particular explained that the shift illustrated the “triumph of the forces of Reason over the

1

Seneca, “On Firmness” in Moral Essays (New York:CP Putnam’s Sons and Wm Heinemann Ltd., 1928)
XIV, 1. P. 89.
2
Ann Macy Roth, “Father Earth, Mother Sky: Ancient Egyptian Beliefs about Conception and Fertility,”
chapter found in Reading the Body: Representations and Remains in the Archaeological Record, Alison
E. Rautman, ed. (Philadelphia: UPenn Press, 1999) found online at https://as.nyu.edu/content/dam/nyuas/faculty/documents/RothFatherEarthMotherSky.pdf. Egyptian myths associated male gods with fertility
rather than anything female, but this relates to the usual passive principle attributed to women, who for
that reason were thought to have little to do in initiating new life. Moreover, many androgynous actions
complicate and confuse the stories.
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darkness of the earlier earth mysteries”3—reason clearly being confined to discursive logic
alone. Unfortunately, despite this evolution Lloyd posits that the goddesses themselves never
entered fully into that rational sphere. In shaking off the power of the older Delphic oracles, she
explains, “reason leaves behind the forces associated with female power. What had to be shed
in developing culturally-prized rationality was, from the start, symbolically associated with
femaleness.”4
The deeply influential Pythagoras, Greek philosopher and mystic, created a “table of opposites”
which included form and formlessness, a category wherein he associates maleness with clear
activity and rational thought, and the feminine with “vague and indeterminate” passivity—the
former clearly being superior.5 Surely, inaccurate biological facts were a driving force in
assigning to the man sole responsibility for creating new life, as outlined by Aeschylus in
Eumenides:
The mother to the child that men call hers
Is no true life-begetter, but a nurse
Of live seed. ’Tis the shower of the seed
Alone begetteth. Woman comes at need,
A stranger, to hold safe in trust and love
That bud of her life—save when God above
Wills that it die.6
Echoing this very image, is it any wonder that Plato (428-355BC) would subsequently attribute
to Socrates in Menexenus the claim that “for the woman in her conception and generation is but
the imitation of the earth”?7 Although Plato furthered the discussion surrounding form and
formlessness, with that statement he shows that “the darkness of the earlier earth mysteries”
couldn’t be entirely overcome, and such thinking has deeply influenced the discussion until this
very day. Moreover, Sister Prudence Allen, in her exhaustive study of how the ancients viewed

3

Genevieve Lloyd, The Man of Reason: ‘Male’ and ‘Female’ in Western Philosophy (London: Routledge,
1995), p. 2.
4
Ibid., p. 3.
5
Ibid.
6
Aeschylus, Eumenides, quoted in Lloyd, p. 4.
7
Plato, Menexenus, found on Gutenburg.org (https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1682/1682-h/1682-h.htm).
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women, explains that Plato reduces woman to “an abstract cosmic female principle.”8 She
quotes from his work, Timaeus:
[The woman] is the natural recipient of all impressions, and is stirred and informed by
them, and appears different from time to time by reason of them. But the forms which go
into and go out of her are the likeness of eternal realities modelled after the patterns in a
wonderful and mysterious manner.9
Eventually the form-formless dichotomy was shaped into a form-matter distinction, and Plato
cast form as the rational aspects of the universe and matter as irrational and indeterminate. As
Lloyd explains, “the relationship of the world-soul to the world is mirrored in that of the rational
soul to the body which is subject to it.”10 The predominant principle at play is still the superiority
of activity over passivity, again related to male and female respectively, but the difference
between Plato’s cosmology and others that followed (specifically that of Aristotle) concerns the
nature of “form” itself. The key to Plato’s theory is that a world of forms transcend our own
world, containing the essence of things, and are only appropriated by individuals to varying
degrees. Man, whom he believed to be the active rational principle of life, can appropriate forms
more perfectly than the woman, specifically because of her passive role in procreation and how
it ties her to matter.11
There is another essential aspect to Platonism that will impact this topic. It must be kept in mind
that the theory of the transcendence of form led its adherents to consider the substantial form
less wedded to the particular matter in which it was instantiated than to the ideal to which the
object conformed. This, combined with (or leading to) Plato’s belief in reincarnation, required
him to posit that the soul existed apart from the body, and since a single soul could attach to
both males and females over time, it had no inherent sexual identity, leading Allen to conclude:
the identity of a woman or man comes from their mind (or soul) and not from their body.
The material aspects of generation, which played such a crucial role on the cosmic level
of male and female identity, have no role at all on the level of actual human existence.”12
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Prudence Allen, RSM, The Concept of Woman: The Aristotelian Revolution, 750BC-AD1250 (Grand
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1997). p. 59.
9
Allen, p. 59.
10
Lloyd, p. 5.
11
Plato’s cosmology can be found in Timaeus, and reference to matter and form specifically in par. 51b7–
e6. Although his theory of forms shifted somewhat over the course of his life, forms as ideas were always
separate from actual things, as explained here: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plato-timaeus/
12
Allen, p. 61.
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Although such a dichotomy between the mind and the body might lead one to suggest that the
body hardly matters (and Plato did truly wish both men and women to pursue wisdom), the
cosmic principles still required that women were more bound by their materiality because of
pregnancy. This Plato confirms when, in his insistence that the body must be overcome in the
pursuit of higher truths, he admits it was harder for women who are fundamentally weaker, and
by suggesting in Timaeus that cowardly or unrighteous men would be punished in their next life
by being incarnated as women.13 In sum, Lloyd concludes: “This Platonic theme recurs
throughout the subsequent history of western thought in ways that both exploit and reinforce the
long-standing associations between maleness and form and femaleness and matter.”14
Such is the philosophical inheritance passed on to western civilisation; having begun with
venerating women for their fertility, it subsequently lifted that capacity out of its mere matter and
joined it to a cosmic form that transcended human generation. It was in this milieu that the
Christian message spread, sometimes accommodating these premises and often challenging
them, trying to establish a fundamental equality between men and women while grappling with
both the material and spiritual aspects of reproduction. It wasn’t until Aquinas (d. 1274) applied
the Aristotelian prism to Christian revelation that human rationality and freedom could be
understood in their richest, most complete sense.

13
14

Allen, p. 62.
Lloyd, p. 5.
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Concerning times and seasons, brothers, you have no need for anything to be written to
you. For you yourselves know very well that the day of the Lord will come like a thief at
night. When people are saying, “Peace and security,” then sudden disaster comes upon
them, like labor pains upon a pregnant woman, and they will not escape. But you,
brothers, are not in darkness, for that day to overtake you like a thief (1 Thes 5:1-4).
Chapter Three: Three Views of Pregnancy
While almost every aspect of the Catholic faith has been disputed over the millennia, it wasn’t
until the 20th century that critics honed in on the foundational principle: “male and female He
made them” (Gen 3:15). The perennial tension between man and woman has been a topic
discussed since antiquity, but while previously the debates addressed how society ought to be
structured to accommodate the perceived differences, post-modernists went deeper because of
two foundational changes: the first being the near ubiquitous access to technology separating
sexual intimacy from its procreative aspect, and the second, following in swift order, being
widespread rejection of the moral restraint that had previously tied sexual intimacy to life-long
unions. This rejection was justified by insisting that the long panorama of theological treatises,
legal codes, and social arrangements were merely a series of social constructs—based on
carefully crafted myths, and reinforced by tradition and language—collectively meant to benefit
men and oppress women. Thus, Christians found themselves on the front lines of a vicious
assault against the most conventional pieties, and the attack that launched a systematic
deconstruction of the very ideas of male and female couldn’t help but to recalibrate the value
and meaning of motherhood.
Motherhood has always been highlighted as the nexus of asymmetry between the sexes, but
while previous generations had simply accepted it as a phenomenon to be managed, the
cultural and technological changes that swept through Europe and North America in the 20th
century upended the usual assumptions. The wider acceptance of women living independently
while engaging in uncommitted sexual relations have combined to allow women to reject
motherhood entirely.15 Moreover, several interesting arguments have challenged its very
rationality as an endeavor—by those both inside and outside the Catholic Church. This paper
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Presently, women can reject motherhood by accessing contraceptives, sterilization procedures, and
abortion, all of which are widely available. While these options are certainly not new (with myriad cultures
also having countenanced infanticide when needed) they are not only accessible but rarely discouraged.
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will begin by comparing and contrasting three disparate points of view which highlight how
pregnancy—an apparent biological process—specifically relates to our rational nature.
Simone de Beauvoir (1908-1986)
While the vast majority of early feminists in the 18th and 19th centuries accepted the premise
that pregnancy was a fact of life that had to be respected, by the 20th century the renowned
philosopher, Simone de Beauvoir, explosively insisted that motherhood itself was the cultural
construct that had to be rejected if women were to be the protagonists of their own lives. Her
ground-breaking work, The Second Sex (1947), attacks motherhood from many angles—
cultural, sociological, psychological, and biological—and she insists that motherhood is a
biological trap that forces women to “sacrifice their individuality,”16 that the woman is “first
violated ... then alienated,”17 while pregnant “she seems possessed by outside forces,”18 and
most importantly, since her body is designed to harbour “foreign life,” she cannot simply inhabit
her body as a man can. “From puberty to menopause she is the principal site of a story that
takes place in her and does not concern her personally … Her body is an alienated opaque
thing; something other than her.”19
While she acknowledges a wide range of psychological reactions that women exhibit during
pregnancy—from joyful anticipation to deep anxiety and anger—de Beauvoir stresses, echoing
Aeschylus, that “she does not really make the child: it is made in her; her flesh only engenders
flesh: she is incapable of founding an existence that will have to found itself.”20 De Beauvoir
goes so far as to insist that it is “rather horrible that a parasitic body should proliferate within her
body,” and its growth will haunt the mother with images of “swelling, tearing, hemorrhages.” The
child is not only an alien force drawing his existence from her very flesh, but alienates her as
well from who she could otherwise be, reducing her to “plant and animal, a collection of colloids,
and incubator, an egg...a passive instrument of life.”21

16

Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, p. 27.
Ibid., p. 36.
18
Ibid., p. 38.
19
Ibid., pp. 40-41.
20
Ibid., p. 539.
21
Ibid., p. 538.
17
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While later generations of feminists have excoriated de Beauvoir for being reductionist in her
insistence that the body itself continues to define women, Julie K. Ward reminds us that de
Beauvoir spoke of “body” in two different ways. In the Cartesian view, the above account of
pregnancy offers an example of the body as res extensa, which traps women and alienates
them from their actual selves; but her second use of “body” is the social construct defining
motherhood—the conventions that she believes have been hijacked by “patriarchal forces” to
prohibit women from pursuing meaningful activities.22 After lamenting the woman’s physical
weakness compared to men, her ignorance of the wider world, and her inferior abilities to
persevere, de Beauvoir concludes, “This means that her individual life is not as rich as a
man’s.”23 In what does “richness” consist? She explains:
The worst curse on woman is her exclusion from warrior expeditions; it is not in giving
life but in risking his life that man raises himself above the animal; this is why throughout
humanity, superiority has been granted not to the sex that gives birth but to the one that
kills.24
Here we hold one essential key to her thesis. Despite the importance of reproduction to the
survival of any species, and how essential it is for sustaining any given human culture (as
exemplified by the widespread fertility cults mentioned above), de Beauvoir claims that since,
biologically, a species maintains itself only by re-creating itself, the woman’s “natural function” of
mothering, even though a “vital process,” has no transcendent meaning nor does it produce
anything new: it is “nothing but a repetition of the same Life in different forms.”25 She only grants
value to the work of men, which “shapes the face of the earth, creates new instruments, invents
and forges the future.”26 As long as a woman must give birth, she is “riveted to her body like an
animal,”27 which “does not provide her reasons for being, and these reasons are more important
than life itself.”28
Michele Schumacher summarizes the two-front battle inherited by those inspired by de
Beauvoir’s view of pregnancy:
22

Julie K. Ward, “Bouvoir’s Two Senses of ‘Body,’” found in Feminist Interpretations of Simone de
Beauvoir , Margaret A. Simons, ed. (University Park, PA: Penn State Press: 2010), p. 225.
23
de Beauvoir, p. 46.
24
de Beauvoir, p. 74.
25
de Beauvoir, p. 74.
26
de Beauvoir, p. 74.
27
de Beauvoir, p. 75.
28
de Beauvoir, p. 74.
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on the one hand, against nature and the argument for biological determinism—or the
reduction of woman to what lies within the realm of her body and its working—and on the
other hand, against cultural determinism—or the pressure to live up to a culturally
promoted ideal of womanhood, orchestrated largely by men of a macho mindset seeking
to keep woman in her place within a man’s world.29
This perceived loss of individual freedom resulting from pregnancy leads de Beauvoir to claim
its irrationality on two levels: the lack of creative, intellectual work involved, and the perverse
value attached to the phenomenon, which she insists was invented by the patriarchy for its own
selfish reasons.
Julia Kristeva (1941- )
Myriad criticisms of de Beauvoir’s work followed, and many worried that, by envying the work of
men and thereby adopting the “male” hierarchy of values, the distinct value of women would be
dismissed—not only by men, but by women themselves. To this end, we now turn to the work of
Julia Kristeva, who flatly rejects de Beauvoir’s view that masculine accomplishments ought to be
the benchmark of value in a society. She agrees that the wider culture has always embraced
motherhood as a means of marginalising women from the public sphere, but, believing
affectivity to be diametrically opposed to the intellect, Kristeva sees the irrationality of women—
which she equates with affectivity—as a necessary counterweight to the sterile, non-affective
rationality of men. Ultimately, she laments the power of men to have arranged society in such a
way as to prioritize logic over a broader form of wisdom.
Regarding pregnancy, she echoes de Beauvoir’s lament about the loss of agency by offering
her own graphic depiction:
Cells fuse, split, and proliferate; volumes grow, tissues stretch, and body fluids change
rhythm, speeding up or slowing down. Within the body, growing as a graft, indomitable,
there is an other. And no one is present, within that simultaneously dual and alien space,
to signify what is going on. ‘It happens but I am not there,’ ‘I cannot realise it, but it goes
on.’ Motherhood’s impossible syllogism.”30
29

Michele M. Schumacher, “Woman’s Self-interest or Sacrificial Motherhood: Personal Desires, Natural
Inclinations and the Meaning of Love,” The Thomist: A Speculative Quarterly Review, Volume 77,
Number 1, January 2013, p. 74.
30
Julia Kristeva, “Motherhood according to Giovanni Bellini,” found in The Portable Kristeva Reader,
Kelly Oliver, ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002). p. 303. It should be said from the outset
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Thus, from the outset we see that agency and subjectivity will continue to predominate the
conversation, despite the rejection of de Beauvoir’s attack on biological determinism. Political
Scientist Linda M.G. Zerilli, who specialises in the areas of gender and sexuality, has carefully
weighed the work of de Beauvoir and Kristeva, and reminds us that the latter has moved the
pregnant woman away from being what the former claims to be an irrational animal without
meaning, to, in her own curious words, “the threshold between nature and culture, biology and
language”31—which makes her a cipher of sorts. While Zerelli shows that both thinkers agree
that “the maternal body is the site of a radical splitting of the female subject,”32 the new essential
question is how to define the process. Most feminists see that motherhood cannot be rejected
out of hand as oppressive, but neither is it to be welcomed on “masculinist” terms—meaning
having either less value than other endeavors or a hyper-valuation beyond the woman for
society itself. This is where Zerelli indicates that the “political space” inherent in pregnancy is
well-defined by Kristeva as “a state beyond representation, an unsignifiable space in which the
mother-to-be may trouble the word but at the unspeakable price of losing her own relationship to
language.”33 “Unsignifiable space” seems to be shorthand for a phenomenon that evades logic,
and refuses even to be categorised for fear that it will be a means to corner women—either by
men or society in general—into losing their autonomy.
Rather than simply accepting pregnancy and motherhood as a natural event, Kristeva poses a
question: “What does this desire for motherhood correspond to?”34 With the emphasis on
affectivity and personal experience, we see why she describes pregnancy as a “threshold,” for
there is no assumption that pregnancy itself signifies anything. Kristeva uses “enlightened
humanism” as a tool to liberate the body from any received meaning. She insists, still, that “the
mother as subject is a delusion,”35 and Zerilli explains that this is both because of the mother’s
inability to describe the process of pregnancy (since it is unsignifiable space) and her refusal to

that many insist that Kristeva did not call herself a feminist, and it must be granted that feminism as a
whole includes such a vast array of thought that internally each person had to establish his particular
beachhead against the larger, often inchoate movement with many contradictory arguments. From this
distance, and for the sake of this paper, I will loosely lump de Beauvoir and Kristeva into the wider
movement while showing the tremendous disparity of their views.
31
Linda M.G. Zerilli, “A process without a subject: Simone de Beauvoir and Julia Kristeva on maternity.”
Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 18(1) 1992, p. 297.
32
Zerilli, p. 113.
33
Zerilli, p. 114.
34
Zerilli, p. 114.
35
The Portable Kristeva, p. 242.
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allow the child to define—or change—her status.36 Zerilli further notes that Kristeva dismisses
any suggestion that a mother is a rational agent in pregnancy, quoting her dismissal of that
possibility as an “existential myth,”37 for her pregnancy is “the site of the collapse of all
oppositions and the confusion of identities.”38
This brings us to a key difference between the two views. Whereas de Beauvoir sees that the
woman is ensnared by a biology that forces her to exist at the level of an animal, both
distracting her from accomplishing things of value and isolating her as “other,” Kristeva refuses
to define pregnancy as a trap. For her it merely creates a situation that transcends language—
or as Zarelli describes it, “a less rigid experience of psychic and corporeal boundaries, and more
fluid conception of identity.”39 It must be stressed that Kristeva does not posit motherhood as a
net good, for it remains undefinable and actually blurs the identity of the woman as subject. It is
this “confusion of identities” which places the event in the hands of the woman to embrace or
reject, and then subsequently attach to it any meaning she wishes.
Here again, we have the question of the rationality of the subject, which both de Beauvoir and
Kristeva find missing in the biological process, but while the former is angered at the loss of the
mother’s voice, the latter revels in the situation as a singular way of being—and specifically a
way of not being a man! Neither will allow that pregnancy is simply a biological referent, nor will
they assign any concrete sociological value. Rather, both insist that it remains a phenomenon
with no fixed value, and women will benefit only by undercutting the collective pressure that
society places on them to bear children. Although both de Beauvoir and Kristeva agree that
woman represents mystery, chaos, and an inchoate symbol of fertility, de Beauvoir laments the
long-standing patriarchal trap, while Kristeva—embracing woman as the epitome of intuition and
sensitivity—prefers to rejoice that woman is the antithesis of logic and rationality.
Gertrude von le Fort (1876-1971)
Lest one dismiss the frustration of feminists as misguided or ill-informed, there are indeed those
within the Catholic Church who have zealously promoted a view of womanhood rife with

36

Zerilli, p. 120.
Zerilli, p. 298.
38
Zerilli, p. 126.
39
Zerilli, p. 131.
37
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troubling suppositions, one example being the poetically distilled “eternal woman” myth—and
often it is such unbalanced views that rightfully draw the ire of those who bridle at the error. The
German freethinker Johann Wolfgang Goethe (1749-1832) was inspired by many elements of
Greek philosophy mentioned above in Chapter One. Thus he incorporated them into his
romanticised view of the differences between men and women, with the former epitomising
action and the latter contemplation. While this might seem somewhat incongruous (since
women might not be considered well-suited for contemplation because of their debased tie to
matter), it was still quite consistent with the public-private dispersal of responsibilities—the
public requiring reason and strength, the private dependent on quiet virtues of the heart. (Thus
we see that the contemplation he had in mind was neither academic nor sophisticated.) His
stress on woman’s call to motherhood as a hidden task subordinated to the good of others was
subsequently baptised by Gertrude von le Fort, a German convert to the Catholic faith. Born in
Westphalia in 1876, this avid student of history, philosophy, and theology entered the Church in
1925, and wrote prolifically on the importance of the gift of motherhood—both physical and
spiritual. Her 1934 work, The Eternal Woman, is a paean to femininity that stresses not only the
elements that she considers essential to femininity, but that womanhood itself transcends the
individual person and is itself an eternal good.
Von le Fort begins with the premise that motherhood is key to the fulfillment of all woman:
The motif that is basic to all that comes to pass through woman is in the highest
measure fundamental also to woman’s function of giving birth … Conception and birth
are the hour and the mystery of life, which means that they are in the hour and the
mystery of woman.40
Here we see that pregnancy is immediately identified with mystery. While it remains to be seen
whether mystery is ipso facto antithetical to rationality, her insistence that it can never be fully
explained coincides with Kristeva’s view of its inchoate nature. As for de Beauvoir’s concern that
the task of pregnancy has little individualistic value and is suborned in a sea of anonymity, von
le Fort doubles down:
On earth the mother is the image of endlessness; centuries pass over her joy and her
sorrow and leave no trace behind. She is ever the same, the boundless abundance, the
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silence, the immutability of life itself, in its power of conceiving, of bearing, of bringing
forth. In this she is comparable only to the fruitful womb of the earth.41
In fact, the closer she is to the earth, the more feminine she is, as von le Fort insists on using
the familiar Platonic form: “The defection of woman [meaning her moral failing] is not really that
of a creature falling earthward; it is rather a descent away from the earth insofar as the earth
itself signifies something womanly, something that awaits in humble readiness.42
So positive is the woman’s humble passivity through motherhood that it even allows her to
transcend the material world: “The mother as such does not bear the individualising marks of
the person, nor does she carry the stamp of an epoch. With her every temporal program ends,
since time itself has no power over her … as mother she conquers time.”43 This certainly adds a
metaphysical twist to de Beauvoir’s thesis about the powerlessness attached to childbearing,
but remains to be seen how this power—contemplative or otherwise—relates to the woman’s
rational nature.
What von le Fort does insist upon is that whatever power accrues to the woman, it is not
personal. Her call to earthy silence should be, rather, an anonymous manifestation of a “primal
mystery.”44 Her qualities are not her own because she is not an individual but a symbol:
Just as the meaning of the symbol does not necessarily coincide with the empiric
character or condition of the individual who for the time being is its bearer, so also the
essential quality that it designates is not restricted to the individual in question.45
Here we find that the anonymity that flows from humility, according to von le Fort, is necessary
to the flourishing of the sign:
As woman primarily denotes not personality but its surrender, so also the endurance that
she is able to give to her descendents is not self-assertion, but something purchased at
the expense of submerging herself into the universal stream of succeeding
generations.46
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There are clear indications that Platonic forms lay the groundwork an ideal motherhood, leading
von le Fort to posit: “When the woman seeks herself, the metaphysical mystery is extinguished,
for in uplifting her own image she destroys the one that is eternal…to seek its reason in the
contradiction between the senses and the spirit is of no avail.47 Thus, the feminine form, which
is so bound up with motherhood, appears to transcend not only the woman, but time itself—
hence the concept of the “eternal woman.” Here, Goethe’s pagan imagery is baptized and
wedded to the Jungian archetype prevalent in her day:
We cannot grasp the metaphysical except under the veil of form, hence necessarily in
the place where we find ourselves confined again to the lower level of the temporal and
the relative. It is only in great art in its supreme moments of inspiration that is capable of
proclaiming under a transitory form the things that are unchanging.48
It is not only the form that is unchanging, but some spell touches the very woman through her
childbearing, so that the power of surrender initiates her into a divine mystery:
The mother is the timeless woman, for she is immutable. Her love does not develop, for
the immutable does not increase. From the first moment it is there. Mother love cannot
be augmented, since this would imply that one it was less great. ...As at the hour of birth,
the mother stakes her life without reserve for the child, so after its birth her life no longer
belongs to herself, but to the child. The timeless woman is she who has become
engulfed in the stream of the generations; the maternal woman is the one who has
submerged herself in the child. Of her Friedrich Hebbel writes:
She has borne a child
To loftiest joy and deepest grief,
And now she is completely lost
In its mute loveliness.49
It is unclear how motherhood can circumvent the entire process of perfection (foundational to
the Christian life) and simply be a channel of perfect love. Nor is it at all explained how the
biological process is rational, other than achieving a transcendent good through the physical
submission to another. Psychiatrist Karl Stern claims that this submission “occurs before there
is conscious reasoning.”50 Through his reading of the work of von le Fort, he suggests that while
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men solve their problems rationally, “woman, wherever she is different from man, ‘acts and
reacts out of the dark, mysterious depths of the unconscious, i.e. affectively, intuitively,
mysteriously. This is no judgment of value but a statement of fact.’”51
Here we come to the full import of suggesting that the holiness of women is innately tied to a
“mysterious” biological process, as Stern extrapolates from von le Fort’s thesis:
The more a man is, the more he is filled to the brim with rationality. Everything he does
and achieves, he does and achieves for a reason, especially for a practical reason. A
woman's love, that divine surrender of her ultra-inner being which the impassioned
woman makes, is perhaps the only thing which is not achieved by reasoning. The core of
the feminine mind, no matter how intelligent the woman may be, is occupied by an
irrational power. If the male is the rational being, the woman is the irrational being.52
As profound and laudatory as may be the idea that woman is a powerhouse of surrender, the
logic relies on creating for woman an irrational path of salvation, which mandates that her
contribution be entirely passive—for she is beholden to an eternal symbol within “the divine
order” to which she gives flesh, as von le Fort explains:
The individual carrier, therefore, has an obligation toward his symbols, which remain
above and beyond him, inviolate and inviolable, even when he no longer recognises
their meaning, or when he has gone so far as to reject or deny them. As a result, the
symbol does not disclose the empiric character or condition of the one who for the time
being is its bearer; but it expresses his metaphysical significance. The bearer may fall
away from his symbol, but the symbol remains.53
While von le Fort relishes this obligation as a path of holiness, an observer might be horrified to
see that there is something more important than the perfection of the human person at stake—
for the true goal, truth be told, is to manifest an abstract, impersonal form to the world. It might
be defended by insisting that conforming to the archetype is the surest path of holiness, but it
seems a circuitous route at best, and even runs the risk of seeing the archetype as an
intermediary between God and the woman.
Thus we have three conflicting views of femininity which, for profoundly different reasons, agree
that motherhood is not rational. Simone de Beauvoir decries female biology which undermines
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her as a subject and interferes with her ability to fulfill a rational life of unique purpose; Julia
Kristeva sees motherhood as equally subjectless but prefers feminine irrationality to the sterile
rationality of men; and Gertrude von le Fort embraces the anonymity of motherhood as a
suprarational symbol, which blazes a path to holiness by swallowing the subject in an eternal
form. Astoundingly, none of these women stop to define rationality beyond a concept vaguely
related to discursive reasoning, and none take time to enfold female affectivity into a deeper
form of wisdom, which Aquinas defines as the perfection of knowledge.54 Each assumes her
reader will associate it with thought patterns or philosophies—de Beauvoir ties it to the secular
pursuits of men which women must enter to find value; Kristeva laments its stifling effect on the
intuitive empathies of women which are a valuable corrective to the world of men; and von le
Fort sees it as entirely unrelated to the material world, touching on divine wisdom but in a
prerational way.
The work which follows must show that the work of the mind and the work of the body are
intricately related, that motherhood is entirely rational, and that women and men can collaborate
on a universally valuable endeavor in ways that benefit each other, the child they create, and
the larger community. Essential to the project is to heal the unfortunate mind-body duality that
persists to this day—a duality that undermines the richness of the embodied wisdom on offer.
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Then God said: Let us make human beings in our image, after our likeness. Let them
have dominion over the fish of the sea, the birds of the air, the tame animals, all the wild
animals, and all the creatures that crawl on the earth. God created mankind in his image;
in the image of God he created them; male and female he created them. God blessed
them and God said to them: Be fertile and multiply; fill the earth and subdue it. Have
dominion over the fish of the sea, the birds of the air, and all the living things that crawl
on the earth (Genesis 1:26-28).
Chapter Four: Hylemorphism
The question at hand concerning motherhood and specifically how it relates to rationality can
only be adequately answered with a proper anthropology that builds on the premise that the
human person is a hylemorphic composite of body and soul.55 H. D. Gardeil argues that this
anthropology is far superior to the Platonic forms of old, as well as the newer bifurcation of the
human person that sprang from the work of Rene Descartes (1596-1650).56 Gardeil argues that
the toxic errors borne of the mind-body duality inherent in both systems lead one to believe that
the body’s relationship to the soul is only accidental, that the body is a mere instrument, that the
person bears only an ephemeral tie to the world, and that there is little transcendent value to
bodily experience.57 In contrast, the topic at hand requires reliable fundamental principles
capable of explaining two things: first, how a creature can grow and change without losing its
essence, and secondly, what moral import its natural processes might bear (and any privations
thereof), because certainly the views of the three women outlined above—while each lacks a
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healthy alternative framework—reveal remarkably logical (if diverse) reactions to the longestablished but disjointed view of the human person.58
Philosophers throughout the ages have been profoundly aware that there is a distinction
between one’s self-awareness and his corporeal self, but it was the work of Aristotle—newly
available to medieval Europe—that allowed Aquinas to synthesize sacred Scripture, sacred
Tradition, and metaphysics, thus “[presenting] theology in a clear and an organized manner.”59
Thus, his theology—while entirely docile to Christian revelation—is augmented by a study of the
intelligibility embedded in creation, which submits to various kinds of causality; and therefore
reason, when applied to the human person, extends beyond its usual association with empirical
sciences and discursive thought.
Foundational to the corpus of Aquinas is his explanation that the soul is the immaterial form of
the body,60 and the principle of life from which knowledge and will flow.61 It is from these two
premises that all we understand about the human person is based, so they must be unpacked in
a way that explains the topic at hand. As noted in Chapter I, Plato suggests that there is a world
of forms, existing beyond our temporal world, which offers categories of subsistent perfections
to which actual creatures conform to greater and lesser degrees. Aristotle keeps the notion of
form, but insists that it isn’t eternal, nor does it exist beyond the thing itself. Rather, the form is
the organising principle that allows the thing to be what it is meant to be. In the case of a human
being, the individuating matter—the body—acts as it does according to this governing principle,
as Aquinas explains, “for all corporeal nature lies under the soul, and is related to it as its matter
and instrument.”62
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Vegetative, Sensitive, and Intellective Capacities with the Soul
With the soul as the organising principle of the body, the nature of the person can be discerned
through the operations that are governed and directed by the soul.63 These operations, or
actions, reveal the capacities of the soul, and are distinguished by their objects. The first of the
three basic powers or capacities is the vegetative capacity, which directs him to maintain his
existence, to grow, and to reproduce. These activities, which are shared by all living things, are
restricted to the body united to that soul.64 Above this lie the sensitive powers, which deal with
the various stimuli affecting the body, and these capacities extend beyond the individual,
touching on universals related to “every kind of sensible body, and not only with the body united
to the soul.”65 Finally, since humans can extrapolate universals from individual pieces of data
beyond sensible bodies, it is evident that the mind is ordered to comprehending reality itself,66
and here reason is introduced as the intellective power by which the human is able to grasp
truth.
While at first glance, the vegetative powers seem to have the most straightforward relevance to
pregnancy as a reproductive act; but as a rational animal, all of a person’s powers will have an
influence if reproduction is to be fully human. A study of the powers in the sensitive soul reveals
just one dimension of the essential bridge between the material world and the intellect, which
depends on the organic body for sensory inputs. These sensory representations—called
phantasms—provide data that would otherwise remain inaccessible to the immaterial mind,
allowing the human intellect to know things, which is what it was made for. Beyond the five
organic senses of sight, hearing, taste, touch, and smell are the additional internal powers of
estimation, memory, imagination, and common sense.67 Interestingly, although Thomas settled
on naming the four internal senses as such, he was distilling long-standing Greek, Hebrew, and
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Arabic thoughts on these powers.68 These capacities allow the person to warehouse
experiences in what Thomas describes as “a kind of treasury for forms,” accessible for study or
comparison even when the items in question are no longer present to the senses.69 These
impressions are not only the bridge between the person and the world, but are tools turned
inwardly to process the workings of the vegetative powers. From sensing pain to assessing
comforts, it cannot be stressed enough how these internal senses interact to add depth and
meaning to personal experience—both sensory and intuitive—the very topic which permeates
discussions concerning how women relate to rationality. Moreover as we look into the workings
of the human mind, Thomas shows that this information is essential to how all humans reason,
whether male or female—and certainly laying the foundation for showing how rationality will
exceed the realm of sterile logic.
The third capacity, that of intellection, is itself an operation of the rational soul fed by the
combined inputs of the internal and external senses, and ordered to “the apprehending of
intelligible truth.”70 With Augustine as his primary authority, Thomas posits that “reason, intellect,
and mind are one capacity,”71 explaining further that reason is the systematic progression
towards that apprehension, “advancing from one object to another,”72 and since each of these
intermediary objects needs to be weighed in its own right, it is evident that the process of
intellectualisation is one of reasoning and the two cannot be separated. To be rational is to
engage in what Dionysius describes as a “mental discussion,”73 and the fodder for this activity is
the product of five external senses seamlessly filtered through the four internal senses named
above.
The challenge has long been to explain the hylemorphic person as a substantial unity, and in
this regard Thomas sought in particular to counter Platonic ideas, which he summarizes: “Plato
and his school held that the intellectual soul is not united to the body as form to matter, but only
as a mover to movable, for he said that the soul is in the body as a sailor in a boat. In this way
the union of the soul and body would only be by virtual contact.”74 Thomas believes it to be
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essential to reject any dichotomy between senses and the intellect. Beyond his most obvious
argument that the mind can’t operate without phantasms—the species it receives through the
senses—he illustrates two additional kinds of integration: first an uninterrupted range from
lowest power to highest powers, and secondly a give-and-take that cements the body-soul
compound into one substantial being. Regarding the first kind, Thomas explains that even
human reproduction, which appears to be strictly a bodily activity, requires another (specifically:
a member of the other sex) for its operation, which “approaches the stature of a sensitive
soul,”75 but this is not unique to this one act, “for the highest of the lowest natures touches the
lowest of the higher,”76 a concept that he traces back to Dionysius. There is even in the intellect
a stratum from lower to higher reason, ranging from practical understanding of the temporal
world to the universal truths grasped through contemplation. Elsewhere, he concludes from this
wide-ranging stratum that, “there are, in other words, no gaps in the created world. Instead there
is a continuum from the least to the most perfect and complete.”77
Regarding the second kind of integration, while there exists no “space” that could separate the
mind from the body, the constant interplay among capacities further helps to disprove both the
Platonic and Cartesian dichotomies. Thomas explains, “since what has less priority exists for
the sake of what has more, matter exists for the sake of substantial form, whereas conversely
an accidental form exists for completing the subject.”78 Therefore, although it was explained
above that the substantial form is the source of perfection for all aspects of the person—body
and soul—the body completes the subject, such that it is also the very means of perfection
through its proper operations. Moreover, there is constant internal mediation among the
capacities, as they have their own, entwined causal relations.79 So while the nutritive soul is last
in terms of sophistication, it is first in light of its foundational importance for the subject. It begins
with life, then growth and health, leading to the generation of more lives—all of which allow the
perfection of the senses and a broader and deeper intellect, but conversely the body would
neither know how to form itself and process the sensory inputs without the intellect to order and
guide its understanding of itself and the world. “So in one way the senses originate in the
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intellect,” summarizes Pasnau, “whereas in another way the intellect originates in the senses.”80
This interplay is summarized in another way by Rudi TeVelde:
The spiritual soul of man is subsisting by itself, but at the same time the soul is the form
of the body, which serves the realization of the proper end of man, that is, the ultimate
perfection of his spiritual nature. The body is therefore subordinate to the soul;
ontologically speaking, the body exists for the sake of the soul in as much as it enables
the realization of man’s spiritual being.”81
Inclination
As noted above, the two fundamental dimensions of the intellectual soul are knowledge and will,
and whereas the body provides the intellect with those phantasms that allow it to know, the will
operates through the appetites, by which the intellect moves the body. These appetites reveal
how the soul, as substantial form, is in every part of the body entirely, but moreover how the
form actualizes all the other powers of the body.82
Thomas defines an appetite as “nothing other than a certain inclination towards something on
the part of what has the appetite,”83 and here we begin to see the broadest hints of final
causality in the creature, thus it would be helpful to revisit the Aristotelian understanding of that
topic, which was essential to Aquinas’ view. Unfortunately, as Austriaco points out, “the
mechanical worldview that is prevalent in our own day ... is a worldview that we inherited from
the early modern period in the seventeenth century.”84 This mechanistic view is preoccupied
with the study of how material forces and powers relate to motion and activity, focusing on that
which is observable and quantifiable; this flattens the inherited explanations—both ancient and
medieval—that were entirely comfortable in probing the inner workings of things to surmise their
purpose. Citing Aquinas, who offers that “it is said that a cause is that from which existence
follows from another” (de Prin, 18), Austriaco explains therefore that “within the Thomistic
framework, causes explain how a thing comes into being, how it remains in being, and
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eventually, how it ceases to be, by becoming something else.”85 Therefore, in addition to
external mechanical causes, Aquinas’ view depends firmly on the nature inherent in forms as
well as agency and ends to explain creation. This will give a coherence to human action on both
individual level and within society—coherence which actually expands the rationality of human
actions. Specifically, the two appetites that drive action—intellectual (or the will, seeking the
good) and sensitive (desiring what is suitable)—are distinct powers differentiated by their
objects, and the latter, being less rational, should be directed by the former.86
All natural forms contain within themselves causal principles, and natural inclinations accrue
from these principles. The four causes—formal, material, efficient, and final—-together create
an interdependent system or, as Gardeil defines it, “a closely knit economy.”87 Relating to our
discussion, the first two relate specifically to the soul and the body; but understanding inclination
requires a firm grasp of the interplay between formal and final causes, the latter illustrating the
end (or object) of actions. The actions reveal an obvious relationship between the form which
(through the necessary materials) serves an end, although the timeline might lead some to
object to how an end (which comes later) can be a cause (which ought to come prior). In this
regard, Thomas offers a firm reply: “It should be said that an end, even if it comes last in
execution, still comes first in the agent’s intention. And in this way it has the character of a
cause,”88 leading Gardeil to point out an essential truth, “Form and end [as causes] have
coincident meanings and what is form in one respect is also end from another.”89
All that remains, in this regard, is to emphasize that the end, in itself, is good, as Aquinas
explains:
Now as “being” is the first thing that falls under the apprehension simply, so “good” is the
first thing that falls under the apprehension of the practical reason, which is directed to
action: since every agent acts for an end under the aspect of good. Consequently the
first principle of practical reason is one founded on the notion of good, viz. That “good is
that which all things seek after.”90
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This explains the good of creation, for each thing bears within it not only the inclination towards
this good, but the actual good itself as cause and ordering principle.
Embodied Interiority
Having established that each thing in the natural world is instilled with its own inclinations, the
next consideration is to apply the principle to human beings, whose intellect far surpasses that
of other animals and yet whose intellective capacities are part of a hylemorphic nature. Servais
Pinckaers explains that in humans there are five natural inclinations that can be called “primitive
spiritual instincts,” which “flow from the essential components of our nature and are linked to the
general notions that philosophers call the ‘transcendentals’ or the ‘universal attributes.’” These
include the yearning for the good, for truth, for self-preservation, to reproduce, and to live in a
society.91 The first inclination is most important for—rather than creating tension—“it gathers the
other inclinations into one dynamic stream,” linking natural law to the eternal law. Pinckaers
continues:
Let us note that natural law does not appear as a barrier to freedom, but, in St Thomas,
possesses a basically dynamic nature: it proceeds from the natural inclination and
yearnings for the preservation of being, the gift of life, the good, truth, and life in
society… The natural law and the Decalogue can be ordered to the Gospel Law as to a
higher perfection, a total fulfillment.92
Understanding the spectrum that includes the natural law inscribed in our being, each person’s
desire for happiness, and ultimately the “the fulness of perfection”93 is essential to showing how
rationality permeates all the powers of the body, and harnesses them for the greater good.
The second instinct—the desire for truth—gives rise to a framework for the complex work
outlined above, as the body works to distill its impressions into the phantasms that allow the
mind to extrapolate the meaning of reality. While consistent debates of past millennia highlight
the differences between men and women (a robust debate which continues with no end in sight)
the heart of the matter at present may be how each comes to know truth, which in the post
Enlightenment view has in one respect largely allowed for the disparagement of women, and in
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another has disparaged wisdom, which can be very difficult to categorise or measure. As much
as the devotees of de Beauvoir may envy the scientific materialism discussed in the world of
men, or the readers of Kristeva may disparage more logical or dispassionate approaches to life,
or the followers of von le Fort may insist that the rationality of the subject is immaterial to her
maternal project, suffice it to say—at this point—that they all strongly believe in something.
None would dispute their mind’s inclination to sift through sensory experiences, assemble
hierarchies of meaning, and establish the truth as they understand it, proving the accuracy of
this transcendental.
Ultimately, as Romanus Cessario explains, “since appetites form a natural part of human life
and well-being,”94 it is increasingly evident how the substantial unity of body and soul cannot be
separated if the person is to be happy and flourish. Given the three powers at play in the human
person (vegetitive, sensory, and appetitive) as well as their myriad appetites, this process lends
itself to a carefully created moral framework that weighs how various actions allow (or don’t
allow) healthy inclinations to be directed to their proper ends. It is on this account that, while the
rationality of the intellective power can perceive truth directly, and command the will accordingly,
the sensitive powers must be managed differently. This is a key dimension of the constant
interplay among the capacities mentioned above, due to the complex causal relations among
the diverse powers that will benefit by a hierarchical model of operation. As Cessario explains,
“both acquired and infused virtues bring about the ordering of the emotions or passions by what
[Thomas] calls the ‘impression of reason’ on the appetites,”95 from which it becomes obvious
that a properly disciplined will impresses reason on the senses, conforming them to higher
goods and proper ends. Aquinas (referencing Aristotle) explains:
Now it is evident that in moral matters the reason holds the place of commander and
mover, while the appetitive power is commanded and moved. But the appetite does not
receive the direction of reason univocally so to say; because it is rational, not essentially,
but by participation.96
This construct allows for a variety of habits and moral actions directed to a variety of objects,
assuring both the freedom of the subject and the layered responses in each situation.
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It is here that one can begin to appreciate the logical consistency of Christian anthropology, by
which Cessario explains that “the imago dei is impressed on the whole of the human person—
viz., the per se unum body-soul composite.”97 Key to this image is the rational nature, which
encompasses his natural inclinations as well as his intellectual pursuits. Thus, having laid the
essential groundwork showing how all the powers of the soul are intertwined, and despite
Thomas’ serious deficiencies regarding biology as it relates to reproduction, it is evident that this
approach to human action mandates that pregnancy be far more than a passive biological
phenomenon.
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For want of a nail, the shoe was lost. For want of a shoe, the horse was lost. For want of
a horse, the rider was lost. For want of a rider, the battle was lost. For want of a battle,
the kingdom was lost, And all for the want of a horseshoe nail (proverb from Poor
Richard’s Almanac, 1758).
Chapter Five: The Rationality of Motherhood
Having outlined the nature of the hylemorphic person—including the interaction among the
powers and capacities of the soul—it has been shown that pregnancy, being a natural process
within a healthy body and inclined to a universal good, is from the outset rational by association.
But the human soul, as seat of knowledge and will, attaches a far wider range of meaning to its
generative powers than mere biology suggests, and with the additional insight offered by
Christian revelation, pregnancy can be studied in three specific ways: as one dimension of a
complex task—or munus—that bears within it a particular end, as the result of a prior free
choice requiring forethought and collaboration, and as a profound means of perfection that
radiates its goodness to the wider world.
The munus of marriage
Given that the intellective powers are charged with directing all inclinations and activities to their
proper ends, it is now possible to consider the first way in which pregnancy is considered
rational, that of being the locus of a larger mission entrusted to intelligent persons. The point of
a mission is to accomplish a goal, and unless that goal is understood, the intelligibility of each
action within the mission cannot make sense—-or be gauged in terms of its success. Moreover,
given the interconnectedness of the powers, it becomes obvious that no inclination can be
weighed in isolation, nor will individual actions reveal their true value apart from the ultimate end
of the human person.
When long-standing dualist tendencies were wedded to the reproductive technologies of the
mid-20th century, the confusion over the nature of human sexuality deepened precipitously,
leading Pope Paul VI to push back firmly with his 1968 encyclical, Humane Vitae. In it, he
acknowledges the Cartesian premise, which by then had led many to ask if “the time has not
come when the transmission of life should be regulated by their intelligence and will rather than
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through the specific rhythms of their own bodies.”98 That Cartesian dualism is further distilled in
his summary of its troubling premise: wherein “human intelligence has both the right and
responsibility to control those forces of irrational nature which come within its ambit.”99 Paul VI
rejects this line of thought as erroneous,100 and while the immediate question he is addressing
concerns contraception (which, he argues, contributes precisely to the dissolution of responsible
behaviour) his response is grounded in an explanation of pregnancy that shows it to be part of a
larger, complex task with a particular end attached.
The way that final causality directs things from within towards their own good was outlined
above, but while Gardeil was quoted above to show the coincident operations among the
causes, Eric Johnston points out that Aristotle, whose template Aquinas used, goes beyond just
showing their interrelations. Aristotle establishes a firm hierarchy prioritizing the final cause,
which Johnston describes as “the cause that makes the agent, the material, and the form to be
what they are.”101 Thomas rests his authority on this salient text in Aristotle’s work:
This species of cause is most powerful among the other causes, for the final cause is
cause of the other causes. For it is clear that the agent acts on account of the end; and
similarly it was shown above with artifacts, that forms are ordered to their use as to an
end, and materials are to their forms as to an end. For this great reason, the end is
called cause of causes (II. Phys., lect. 5).
Moreover, as Johnston points out, “‘end’ primarily encompasses not merely a single act but a
chain of events,”102 and it will become evident that the sequence of these events—which are
often complex, and woven throughout a creation ordered to its own good—cannot help but to
reveal an inner logic.
Thus, Paul VI sought to impress upon his readers the overarching logic of procreation, which he
calls its munus. Janet Smith explains that the term munus is used 21 times in the encyclical, the
first instance being in the opening sentence: “The transmission of human life is a most serious
role (munus) in which married people collaborate freely and responsibly with God the
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Creator.”103 That one word is translated in Humanae Vitae variously as task, mission, duty,
responsibility, skill, and function, depending on the context, naturally drawing attention to the
linguistic history of the document. Janet Smith explains that the document was originally written
in Italian and then translated to Latin, bequeathing to that pivotal text (on which all subsequent
translations depended) a word quite challenging to interpret. Given the myriad renderings even
within this one document, she notes, “the translation ‘duty’ is not incorrect but inadequate, as is
any word, to capture all the important connotations of munus.”104 Despite the negative
connotations associated with “duty,” she insists that there is nothing negative about the actual
concept, “in fact a munus is something that one is honored and, in a sense, privileged to
have.”105 Furthermore, while it can relate to a mission, office, or function—all of which are
decidedly neutral in tone—it will soon be shown that the honour is not simply duty-bound but
more of a treasured gift.
Johnston points out that Aquinas himself used the term munus in relation to marriage in his
Sentences in responding to the question “whether matrimony is fittingly named.” Johnston
explains Aquinas’ assent: “Calling upon the etymology that says matrimonium comes from
matris munium, ‘the duties, or office, of motherhood,’ he writes, ‘since things are for the most
part named from their end.’”106 Moreover, the end extends well beyond the mere bearing and
delivery of the child, as Johnson further explains:
Thomas argues that the female plays a twofold role in childbearing: both contributing to
the conception of the child and giving nutrition to what is conceived. Thus by introducing
nutrition in this context, he makes clear that depositing seed in the womb is not the “end”
of sexual activity. The end of the seed is not just conception but a healthy pregnancy —
and after that a healthy upbringing.107
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Because Aquinas’ view of reproduction includes child-rearing, Johnston concludes: “Thomas
clearly melds the ‘natural’ ordering of biology with the ‘natural’ ordering of human actions.”108
Paul Gondreau points out that this reveals our distinctive rationality, for if it is neglected and
“human sexuality is ordered exclusively to procreation, we distinguish in no way the meaning
and purpose of our sexuality from that of the rest of the animal kingdom.”109 Animals don’t have
missions, per se, which explains the use of munus in relation to children—for women, indeed,
are giving birth to rational persons who require so much more! Properly speaking, the entire
process is permeated with logic, for the decision to bear a child requires a prior decision to
create a home wherein a child can successfully grow to adulthood in relationship to both
parents.
In this regard, although the sexual organs are naturally ordered to procreation, it becomes clear
that the complex munus of procreation doesn’t begin with their actualization. Rather, pregnancy
is situated squarely between the choice of a partner and the decisions needed to provide for the
well-being of the developing child, and this sequence of rational acts includes marriage,110
pregnancy, a safe delivery, good nutrition, education, and a host of other inputs over the years.
Johnston explains that collectively these actions should bear a natural rectitude: “This rectitude
is defined, not by the outcome of the specific act, but by the way it relates to the longer natural
process.”111
This deepening appreciation for the collaborative task of parenting has led to a call for the ends
of marriage to be understood in a fresher way. Janet Smith explains,
Humanae Vitae portrays “having children” or “transmitting life” less as the primary end or
purpose of marriage than as an essential munus of marriage. Again, it is an
“assignment” entrusted to spouses and a service that they may perform for God. What is
needed here, it seems, is a better understanding of the marital vocation which includes
this munus.”112
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Given the fact that pregnancy has increasingly been misunderstood in the modern world as an
atomised incident without a fixed meaning, orienting it firmly as the locus of a larger mission will
help to reveal its holistic logic. In this regard, Gondreau suggests that the final cause of
marriage be framed in language that prioritizes this comprehensive reality.
As matter is for the sake of form, as the body is for the sake of the soul, as lower is for
the sake of the higher, so is human sexuality for the sake of the soul’s highest, noblest
functions: intellectual knowing and loving. Sexuality implies, then, not only the offering of
one’s (procreative) body, but the offering of one’s entire self in the deepest bonds of
knowledge and love, in the deepest bonds of personal communion and friendship.113
With hylemorphism as the cornerstone of a healthy anthropology, there is far more respect for
the shared task entrusted primarily (for a time) to women, and far less potential for her to suffer
a loss of subjectivity within pregnancy, for, as Gondreau points out, “human sexuality, in its
primary ordering to procreation as owing to the body, is at the same time ordered essentially to
personal, unitive love as expressive of our rationality.”114 The child, in fact, should be a catalyst
for deepening this personal bond among those most closely charged with the mission of his
formation.
One final, essential element of this larger mission is the relation between one family’s
successful embrace of the munus of reproduction and the wider community. Recall that
Pinckaers’ list of natural appetites included the inclination to live in a society, which is not just on
a primal level of shared needs, but on a richer desire to build communion. This is indicated by
the sophistication of all human languages, which allows the meaningful sharing of thoughts and
ideas, and the construction of positive laws that safeguard the myriad relationships found
therein. The family is essential on the most granular level, Pinckaers explains, since it forms
those who will live in the society, including how their very desires are shaped and disciplined:
It is also clear that the other inclinations develop within the context of the family. The
family is where the first experiences of life occur. It is where we learn about love and
happiness, make our first concrete judgements concerning good and evil, and receive
our moral education.115
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Johnston summarizes the entire argument by positing that “the goodness of society itself is built
on the biological substratum of family and procreation.”116
The proverb cited at the outset of this chapter is but one paradigm for his deeply-layered truth,
which reveals the importance of assuring the rectitude and relationality of each action attached
to a complex task. In that regard, pregnancy cannot be isolated—either in essence or in
meaning—for it is the result of an intimate act that leads to the creation of a person who will
need years of devoted care. Both of these aspects—sexual intimacy and parenthood—mean
that pregnancy is grounded in communicative actions that come before and after, each requiring
rational decisions. This is at the heart of the munus of pregnancy.
Pregnancy as a free and rational choice
It is obvious by now that pregnancy doesn’t happen in a vacuum, nor is it a solitary endeavor. In
most circumstances, there was a decision to engage in intimate actions that bore the potential
of creating a new, rational soul. Unfortunately, in addition to the reproductive technologies that
mask the life-giving capacity attached to sexual intimacy—actually separating in the minds of
some young people the consequences of their actions—modern philosophies have confused
most people about the nature and purpose of freedom. Only when freedom is rightly understood
will the decisions surrounding sexual activities bear a rectitude that conforms to the principles of
the human soul.
Servais Pinckaers has worked tirelessly to bring forward the proper Christian understanding of
freedom which had been waylaid in the late Middle Ages. Returning to the phenomenon of
appetites in the human person and how, when well-ordered, they direct him to the good,
Pinckaers notes:
Inclinations, like the natural law, were God’s most precious work in the human person, a
direct, unique participation in his own wisdom, goodness, and freedom and the emanation of the eternal law. Saint Thomas’ entire moral theology was based largely on his
teaching on natural inclinations and on the freedom for the good that activated them.117
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Thus he draws a line from the lowest elements of our nature to our higher appetites, and then
continues the trajectory into the realm of the divine—with authentic freedom as the connective
thread.
Aquinas’ premise that there are no gaps between the irrational and rational powers in a human
soul because of the interrelations among the powers and their single organising principle has
been illustrated above, as was Pinckaers’ point that there is no gap between natural law and the
eternal law. Unfortunately, modern thinking has allowed a pernicious gap to separate freedom
from rationality—especially that which aligns natural inclinations with their proper [good] ends.
Ignoring the truth that knowledge and will derive their powers from the soul as principle, many
promote this error, Pinckaers explains, by insisting that “free will [is] the prime faculty, anterior to
intelligence and will as well as their acts.” In this construct, which he calls “freedom of
indifference” (because of the will’s “radical indetermination”),118 some suggest that in order for
the will to remain free, it must be independent of any influence—whether moral constraints or
natural inclinations. John Lamont summarizes this alternative construct, which “is defined by its
rejection of St. Thomas's claim that there is something the will wills of necessity, and by its
assertion that freedom consists purely in the power to choose between alternatives.”119
The source of the error, according to Pinckaers, is William of Ockham, whom he quotes, “For I
can freely choose to know or not to know, to will or not to will.”120 Establishing freedom as prior
to knowledge and will not only pits the mind against the body, but derails free will from its innate
task to pursue the good. This sheds a fresh light on Kristeva’s question cited above: “What does
this desire for motherhood correspond to?” Framing the question this way (with an emphasis on
the underlying desire) it becomes evident that when the will is paramount, many believe it can
shape reality anew. Pinckaers explains the result of insisting that each action be an atomized,
unencumbered event: “The harmony between humanity and nature is destroyed by a freedom
that claims to be ‘indifferent’ to nature and defines itself as ‘non-nature.’”121 This train of thought,
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thereby, considers the body not only as an indifferent tool, but its very nature is seen on many
occasions as an enemy to be conquered. A rejection of the internal logic of natural inclinations
means that their ends are no longer intelligible signposts to natural and supernatural ends. In
deconstructing this logical cohesion, Lamont notes, the person is not only indifferent to natural
appetites, but stripped of understanding the intelligible motivations for his actions, “because
liberty of indifference must retain the power to reject any good at all presented to it by the
intellect. The notion of such a power is incompatible with St. Thomas's very first principle of
practical reason.”122
When freedom is morally indifferent in such a way, each person is invited to determine his own
syllabus of meaning unrelated to the inscribed munus of human acts, which means that not only
does this form of freedom allow for that perennial mind-body duality to emerge, but each person
is now isolated in his own construct, unable to share the complex tasks that he is charged with
undertaking. Just as he recognizes no moral demands, he cannot impose any on other people,
nor can he find a fixed meaning for actions, which leaves each person adrift in a sea of
indeterminate paths.
Pinckaers insists that within the healthy anthropology of Aquinas lies a different understanding
of freedom, which he calls “freedom for excellence” (which Lamont prefers to call "teleological
liberty).”123 In this understanding, “we find a freedom that presupposes natural inclinations and
takes root in them so as to draw forth the strength needed for their development.”124 Since we
are inclined towards the good, these inclinations create a reliable trajectory that helps us choose
the good when it is within sight. He continues:
The natural root of freedom develops in us principally through a sense of the true and
the good, of uprightness and love, and through a desire for knowledge and happiness.
Or again, by what the ancients called semina virtutum, the seeds of virtue.125
Here, Pinckaers reveals how this trajectory connects the most basic natural functions with the
greatest potential for a human person, which is the life of virtue, which points to the most basic
theological insight of the Church, that grace builds on nature. As Lamont explains, “The law of
nature for St. Thomas works from the inside; the will moves towards the ultimate end, via the
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particular goods that participate in it,”126 and hence even the most basic good—pregnancy—is
both natural and virtuous.
Since pregnancy is by its nature the means of creating a new and separate person, sexual
union is, at its heart, in the words of Chad Engelland, an invitation, because “it invites new life to
come to be as its natural result.”127 Such an invitation inherently bears grave responsibilities,
and therefore it stands to reason that its munus—its complexity as a task—demands that it be
couched in a series of virtuous actions. It is for this reason that the Church explains that
freedom, as it relates to procreation, must safeguard the good of the child because of the
lifelong relationships that follow. As Engellend explains:
The advent of each child further entwines the personal identities of the father and
mother, and familial roles are irrevocable ... Thus the invitation offers to the man and the
woman something personal and lasting. Aristotle notes that the child is a good common
to each, but this is not specific enough. The child is not just a common good; he or she is
a personal good that establishes lasting reciprocal roles between the mother and the
father.128
Thus it is fitting that the life-giving potential of the sexual union be treated with the seriousness it
deserves, as Gondreau explains: “To be genuinely human, our sexuality must share in what is
unique and noblest in us; it must be integrated into the totality of our lives as rationally ensouled
embodied beings.” This totality requires a lasting vow that comprehends the fulness of these
life-long reciprocal relationships, as Gondreau insists further, “human sexuality has but one end,
marriage, with its two proximate and complementary ends: the procreative (expressive of the
body) and the unitive (expressive of the soul).”129 Such was the logic of Humanae Vitae, which
stated firmly: “since the duty [munus] entrusted to parents for the good of their children is of
such high dignity and of such great importance, every use of the faculty given by God for the
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procreation of new life is the right and privilege of the married state alone, and must be
contained within the sacred limits of the family."130
Finally this sequence of actions, in order to be the most human [read: rational], should be free in
the most proper sense of the word, which must encompass a teleology grounded in eternal
goods—making “teleological liberty” a most apt term! With this in mind, Pinckaers calls to mind
the Scholastic view, in which sexuality is not limited to the biological realm; for Thomas “it was
realized in man in a different and far richer way than in animals, being integrated in the totality of
human nature, particularly through its coordination with spiritual inclinations.”131 Gondreau
concurs, showing that a holistic understanding of motherhood upends any notions that in
pregnancy a woman hosts an “alien form,” or that it takes place in “unsignifiable space,” or that
she undergoes the “submergence” of her very self. It is the exact opposite, for “rationality—by
which we mean reason and free-will taken together—is expressive of the form (the soul) in the
human being and distinguishes us as humans.”132
Motherhood as a profound means of perfection
It is now essential to weave together the threads thus offered, and to consider whether
pregnancy is not only rational in itself but is an integral component to one path of moral
perfection. If so, then it becomes more than just an intelligible capacity, and even more than a
complex mission—it would elevate the task to a path to eternal salvation. Scripture indicates
that it is, since in his first letter to Timothy, Saint Paul puts it in just such a context:
Adam was not deceived, but the woman was deceived and transgressed. But she will be
saved through motherhood, provided women persevere in faith and love and holiness,
with self-control (1 Tim 2:14-15).
If indeed this is so, it would once more highlight the straightforward trajectory that extends from
lowest to highest good, seamlessly encompassing both natural law and the eternal law revealed
through Christ. Pinckaers, in summarizing what has been assembled thus far, posits this very
point:
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That the knowledge and the will precede free will means that they are the source. The
free choice will be inspired by natural inclinations or spontaneous aspirations toward
truth and goodness that constitute these faculties and flow from the spiritual nature of
the person, ordering her to beatitude and in fact to God as her ultimate end. The work of
free choice is to place acts which possess the quality of truth and goodness, and which
thus lead the human person toward her perfection and beatitude.133
Moreover, it cannot be ignored that in the passage of the Epistle cited above, Paul inserts a
caveat: “provided …,” which is entirely in keeping with the understanding of munus, wherein the
mission of which pregnancy is an integral part includes a complex of decisions, each requiring
prudence and righteous intention. When virtue guides the actions in a harmonious order,
everyone stands to benefit on a variety of levels.
It is also important to remember that although “the woman was deceived and transgressed” —
leading to humanity’s corporate fall from grace—the human person still bore the imago dei,
although admittedly in an obscured way. Aquinas, in clarifying the effects of original sin,
explains that the good in man is three-fold, being composed first of human nature and its
capacities; second, the inclination to virtue; and third a right relationship to God. While the
disordering of the passions undermined the exercise of virtue (corrupting his friendship with
God), the first of these remain essentially good, although “diminished.”134 Pinckaers explains
how this relates specifically to human sexuality:
Sexuality had originated in a primordial inclination of human nature. As such it was the
work of the Creator, according to the Genesis account of the creation of man and
woman. Therefore, whatever might be the deficiencies caused in the individual person
by sin and concupiscence, the seat of unbridled desires, sexuality was recognized as
something basically good and a source of moral excellence.135
Concupiscence—the deformation of the appetites—is responsible for the confusion over the
proper ordering of the reproductive powers. The inclinations, it must be understood, are the
middle ground between their roots (human nature) and their end, which is virtue. Since Thomas
has shown that the roots remain intact, the deformation must relate to the end, which is
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obscured. Thus concupiscence is, in the words of Cessario, “the primal alienation of the human
person from God”136—that very friendship for which he was created.
In light of the natural inclination to know truth and the confusion with which the human race
struggles in that regard, it is important to include an additional translation of munus which has a
wide application in the life of the Church. Smith points out that “dictionaries for Saint Thomas
recommend the translation of munus as ‘gift.’”
For Thomas, munera are both gifts that men give to God, as a part of their oblations and
sacrifices, and gifts that God gives to man, such as an integral nature, and grace, and
the ability to prophesy.”137
This calls to mind the etymology of “munificence,” based on the same word, and meaning an
effusion of gift giving. Thomas himself was generous with the word, applying it to myriad actions
of ordinary Christians, with the priesthood itself, and even regarding the Holy Spirit, the great
Giver of gifts who is himself a gift to us from the Father.138 It stands to reason that if God
exercises care over his creation, then he will supply the capacities to perform the numerous
tasks he entrusts to his creatures.
Here we arrive at the foundational theme permeating Aquinas’ work:that of exitus-reditus—such
that all causality can be understood as a sweeping motion by which all that is created is meant
to return to him. Thus it stands to reason that the gifts that he bestows are innately ordered to
perfection, and when used properly constitute a path of reunion with him. This is the last and
key definition of munus, and Smith points out that the Vulgate uses the same word in many
contexts, such as the offices given to Christians for the good of the Church (Eph 4:11); the gift
of the priesthood, (2 Tim) and even the Holy Spirit as a gift from the Father to his children (Lk
11:13).
If motherhood is a munus, then the “transmission of human life” is both solemn assignment and
gift; moreover it cannot be reduced to a biological phenomenon, nor is it something that a
woman can define for herself. It is the result of a series of rational choices, bearing long-term
implications engaging both intellect and will, and manifests a particular spiritual significance as a
means of perfection.
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The rest of Saint Paul’s caveat, “provided women persevere in faith and love and holiness, with
self-control,” situates this rational act firmly in its proper place, as an expression of faith, which
joins one’s actions to the saving work of Christ, and charity, which was shown above to link the
pregnancy to both the good of the child and the good of the larger community here and in the
hereafter. This, in the highest sense, is what Saint Paul meant when he acknowledged childbearing as a means of salvation, for it is an entirely rational endeavor. Moreover, it highlights
that generous way in which God, in his goodness, doesn’t wish to save us without us, as
Humanae Vitae points out:
Truly, conjugal love most clearly manifests to us its true nature and nobility when we
recognize that it has its origin in the highest source, as it were, in God, Who is Love and
Who is the Father, from whom all parenthood [paternitas] in heaven and earth receives
its name.”139
If matrimony by definition is the institution through which a woman becomes a mother, then in
doing so she allows the man to be a father, an icon of God himself. In this regard, the message
of Humanae Vitae closely follows the logic of Gaudium et Spes, which states: “It ought to be
clear to all that human life and the munus of transmitting [life] are not [realities] restricted only to
this world ... but that they always look to the eternal destiny of man.”140
Here, then, is the culmination of the trajectory mentioned above, which Johnston summarizes:
Thomas’s easy movement between biological and moral “nature” is perhaps surprising.
But his classic presentation of natural law ... similarly defines nature in terms of an
interior principle of motion toward an end. God’s eternal law is present in creation as the
ruling and measuring is present in the ruled and measured: “from his impression they
have their inclination to their proper acts and ends,” their nature.141
It is false, then, to suggest that pregnancy results from the irrational pressure of natural forces, It
is meant to follow upon a free and mutual gift of self, which is proper and exclusive to marriage,
where the spouses seek to establish and nourish a communion of persons. God the Creator
wisely and providently established the family in this way with the intent that he might achieve his
own designs of love through human persons—a twofold plan that allowed us first to participate
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in his gift of generation and secondly through it to reconcile what was lost. In this way, not only
does he entrust this task to his creatures with the capacity to perform it, but the task is itself a
gift that redounds to our own good.
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Feminists are certainly justified in protesting against the depersonalization of women and
their reduction to the status of objects. Their attempt to locate the impetus for this
degradation within Christianity, however, is one more example of a selective reading of
history, based on the myth of total oppression, and filtered through the crystallisation
process of the Enlightenment (Fr Francis Martin).142
Chapter Six: Response to the Three Views of Pregnancy
Having outlined the logic of a Catholic anthropology that hinges on a proper understanding of
the hylemorphic person, it remains to respond to the three contrary views above. One cannot
responsibly dismiss the consistent expression of deep frustration caused by the challenges
unique to women’s lives, yet neither can we ignore the reasonable and realistic prescriptions of
the Catholic Church that have consistently sought to heal and transform them.
Simone de Beauvoir: Maternity as Alienation
Recall that Simone de Beauvoir’s primary frustration lay in woman’s very capacity to become
pregnant, which meant that “from puberty to menopause she is the principal site of a story that
takes place in her and does not concern her personally … Her body is an alienated opaque
thing; something other than her.”143 The dualism at the heart of the claim is now obvious,
reflecting a combination of Plato’s notion that each soul is trapped in a body, and Descartes’
claim that the mind is both distinct from and independent of the body. While a woman may
indeed be intimidated by the protracted demands of motherhood, it doesn’t logically follow that
human reproduction creates a “foreign, invasive entity that forces the mother to be a passive
instrument of life.”144 This language may certainly resonate with those women who feel trapped
by marriage and its demands, but disparaging the children who come as a natural consequence
of sexual relations only perpetuates the alienation of family members within an institution that
was created precisely for their welcome embrace.
Martin stresses that given the complexities of the industrial age, it is irresponsible to simply
blame the Church for repressing women. He explains that the overarching sense of biological

142

Francis Martin, The Feminist Question, pp. 380-1.
de Beauvoir, pp. 40-41.
144
de Beauvoir, p. 538.
143

45

determinism that so infuriated de Beauvoir—the only value attached to women being their childbearing capacity—was the long result of overlapping trends that gradually diminished the
cultural status and influence of European women over the centuries since the Middle Ages.
While The Second Sex surveys myriad cultures around the world to see how they framed the
maternal task, it was in Europe and America, where a host of concurrent events (from scientific
discoveries to geographical exploration) radically affected family life by the time she was writing.
The domestic economies that women had previously overseen—encompassing the provision for
food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and education, as well as managing the distribution of
labour for any number of people from a single family to an entire castle, convent, or village—
were outsourced piecemeal until she was left with care of her home and children alone. Cottage
industries and participation in local guilds, which had once contributed significantly to women’s
economic freedom, were gradually displaced by new forms of mercantile capitalism, and
wherever the Protestant revolt took hold, the subsequent destruction of convents (which housed
schools) also led to a significant decline in women’s access to education. Previously, those
women who didn’t marry were able to contribute to the arts and sciences in monasteries
renowned for such skills, and yet these options gradually diminished as well, and the cumulative
loss of outlets for the diverse creative gifts of women eventually—understandably—proved
stifling.145
As the broader Catholic milieu diminished, Martin notes, “it was among the philosophes,
particularly Rousseau and d'Holbach, that the ideal of an exclusively domestic role for women
was most forcefully articulated.”146 As economic changes increasingly separated the public and
private spheres of life, the contribution that children provided to the health and well-being of the
larger community was lost. The value of children seemed to rest in the immediate family alone—
both for the work they could do and as a means of maintaining or expanding private property—
and if spouses were not chosen in freedom, much of the joy attached to the munus of
childbearing was lost. Thus, motherhood was increasingly seen by some to be an onerous task
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forced on women by a male-dominated family and endorsed by a male clergy, when in fact the
richness of family life had been twisted beyond recognition by the Enlightenment, “with its
explicit return to a pagan view of reality and its cultivation of power.”147
Hence, de Beauvoir’s charge that motherhood as lived in her time shackled and degraded
women, keeping them from meaningful pursuits, is true on some level. Unfortunately, she
responds by adopting the same one-dimensional hyper-rational view of the world introduced by
the very Enlightenment that marginalized so many of women’s gifts—and yet her prioritization of
material enterprises, such as finance, construction, and the sciences, manages to ignore the
very material from which a human person is made. Moreover, she ignores the deeper wisdom
that aligns bodily realities and natural inclinations with the pursuit of the good, especially the
truth that the good of the family hinges on the good of each of its members, and their good
redounds to the wider society.148
The supreme irony seems to be that de Beauvoir envies those who grant superiority “not to the
sex that gives birth but to the one that kills.”149 Her philosophy, thereby, seems to be a lament
over being crushed by the destructive power of others while seeking to harness that very power
for herself. Despite her desire to praise men, who “invent and forge the future,”150 it is
extraordinary that de Beauvoir cannot see how much of that future is forged in the wombs of
women. Even if one refuses the theological promises attached to childbearing, to insist that the
body is merely an instrument to be conquered—with its inscribed meaning ignored and the
relationships it engenders insulted—is myopic, destructive, and profoundly unenlightened.

Julia Kristeva: Maternity as Unintelligible Space
“Motherhood’s impossible syllogism,” posited by Kristeva insists that pregnancy creates an
unintelligible space, not only lacking definition and logic, but displacing the mother from her own
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body.151 Given the realities of our hylemorphic nature, this cannot be possible apart from poetic
license or psychological rambling. Once again, it is the embrace of a Cartesian duality that
causes a person to attempt to disengage from the body as an appendage or afterthought, and
while the sensations attached to pregnancy may be unfamiliar, there is nothing unintelligible
about the process.
Her claim that “the maternal body is the site of a radical splitting of the female subject”152 is
entirely false, for the woman is simply actualizing one of her innate capacities—a phenomenon
that follows naturally from sexual intimacy during her fertile phase. Instead of being split, to the
contrary, she is now joined by an additional person, whom she has invited by her action, and
who will need her physical generosity and wise governance for a considerable amount of time.
In fact, her intelligence is more important than before, for Gregory Brown highlights Aquinas’
explanation that young children depend on the rational care of their parents:
For a child is by nature part of its father: thus, at first, it is not distinct from its parents as
to its body, so long as it is enfolded within its mother’s womb; and later on after birth,
and before it has the use of its free-will, it is enfolded in the care of its parents, which is
like a spiritual womb.”153
Rather than being divided (split) by pregnancy, a woman’s agency is thereby multiplied for the
foreseeable future. Having called to mind above the relationship among capacities and
appetites, all of which participate in reason, Brown explains that this same concept can be
applied to the family as well, in which those less capable are cared for by those who are
capable:
Human children have many needs but few capabilities. This is most obvious in
pregnancy, when the child is literally enveloped in its mother’s body, from which it
receives nourishment. After birth, children still cannot feed, move, clean, clothe, or
change themselves. Their parents are, as it were, provident for their entire good.154
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As daunting as this may be, such is human generation, and it is increasingly evident that the
natural law mirrors the supernatural world as outlined by Aquinas, who insists that rational
creatures participate in the loving design of God. The mother’s time, granted, will be split, her
resources must be shared, and her confusion may intensify over how to apply her finite energies
each day, but she is still there—the same composite creature—only somewhat more tired
because of the demands on both body and soul.
The greatest shortsightedness in Kristeva’s work is the fact that she (like de Beauvoir) relegates
rationality to the small realm of discursive reason, which undermines the inherent value of
women and their tremendous contribution to the human project. This ignores the long-standing
view of human persons being rational simply because of having both intellect and will, which
direct their actions. As Aquinas explains:
Now man differs from irrational animals in this, that he is master of his actions.
Wherefore those actions alone are properly called human, of which man is master. Now
man is master of his actions through his reason and will; whence, too, the free-will is
defined as "the faculty and will of reason.155
Lest one think that women are marginalised in this point, he specifically notes elsewhere,
The image of God, in its principle signification, namely the intellectual nature, is found
both in man and in woman. Hence, after the words, “To the image of God He created
him,” it is added, “Male and female he created them” (Gen 1:27).156
Despite the links illustrated above, wherein all actions—including reproduction—are rational by
participation with the intellect that directs them, in Kristeva’s construct, not only is each action
detached from any larger project, but the actions of the body are detached from the mind, and
even the woman’s mind is detached from reason itself, which she laments to be a “masculinist”
construct.157
Kristeva insists that pregnancy, as “a state beyond representation,”158 remains
incomprehensible because it cannot be expressed adequately in words, and floats beyond the
rational world as an experience that each woman can define for herself. Thus, the mother’s tie
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to the child, the father, the larger family, and the community must also remain undefined, apart
from the value or construct that the mother alone confers on them. Even that choice is made
more difficult because of Kristeva’s insistence that the pregnancy isn’t a logical sequence of
deliberate actions, but the occasion of “the confusion of identities” (126/82).159 To apply
Gondreau’s term, this “disembodied anthropology”160 is a disservice to any woman who is
embarking on a challenging task, robbing it of all meaning, and removing all the organic
constructs that would both guide her and surround the child with all that he needs to thrive.
Rejoicing in the irrationality of the subject who chooses motherhood on her own terms does no
one any favours, for the very intuition and sensitivity that Kristeva insists lie beyond the rational
are themselves deeply ordered by reason to the good of the other. Rather than believing women
to be the antithesis of a rational society, her natural gifts bring a richness that a well-ordered
society requires in order for it to be fully human—and an essential corrective to those who would
diminish all that reason encompasses into mere scientific logic applied to a strictly material
plane of existence. It is not by accident that the weakest, most vulnerable members of the
human community are entrusted to the most sensitive vessels, for such is foundational to the
wisdom of the human family, which is ordered to happiness—the first principle of practical
reason.161
Gertrude von le Fort: the eternal woman
Now it remains to dissect the impersonal and transcendent passivity that Gertrude von le Fort
idealizes in her writing, such that “the mother as such does not bear the individualising marks of
the person.”162 Her eternal form certainly appears to be a baptized Platonic form, which
eschews any particular rationality, but what is worse, the sign is intended to swallow the
individual in its “primal mystery.”163 It is remarkable that von le Fort’s insistence that being
subsumed into an amorphous, identity-crushing form, “mother,” is the ideal goal for women,
when it was that very anonymity that horrified de Beauvoir. In this context, one can find
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sympathy for de Beauvoir’s fears concerning lifeless maternity, anonymity at the heart of the
maternal relationship, and her horror of losing her very self—for this is indeed what the
Romantics—whom von le Fort admired, idealized. To the extent that motherhood was ever
promoted in this way, one can understand any woman’s instinctual abhorrence of being
annihilated in the mission.
It was Albert (1206-1280) who first insisted in his commentaries on Aristotle that forms do not
exist apart from matter, as Michael Tkacz notes. “The error in question arises out of the Platonic
understanding of the subject of natural science as being the eternal subsistent forms rather than
the form of the substantial material individual.”164 Although Albert’s primary concern was how to
catalogue the natural world, the corollary to his injunction is that if one posits that an eternal
form exists apart from the individual, subjectivity might indeed become blurred (as de Beauvoir
and von le Fort agreed). It is the individuating matter that reveals what is proper to the form,
because, in the case of our topic at hand, reducing motherhood to a platonic form means that
the individuality of each woman who bears children actually does lose her particular identity.
Before responding to the notion of an eternal feminine form promoted by von le Fort, it must be
considered whether what she describes in a Platonic form is justified anywhere in the way that
Aquinas explains universals—those ideas that transcend individuals. In other words, could
motherhood simply be an idea that exists in the mind of God? To answer this epistemological
question, we can consider how Gyula Klima explains Aquinas’s view of language, and that,
foundationally, speech is an attempt to share one’s insight. From the sensory data (explained
above in the section on the soul) universal ideas are extrapolated in the intellect and then put
into words so that they may be communicated. Even given this process,Klima explains that
Thomas still doesn’t see universals as Plato did:
Since for Aquinas there are no universal entities as Plato imagined, we cannot explain
the universality of our universal words by claiming that they signify universal things. The
universality of our words, on account of which they are related not just to one peculiar
sort of thing, a universal, but rather to a multitude, indeed, a potential infinity of ordinary
things, is a result of our ability to conceive of these things in a peculiar manner, namely,
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universally, and to use the word to express this universal conception, or as Aquinas
often refers to it, the universal ratio of these ordinary things.165
The first irony is that the mental construct is directly related to the rationality of the thinker, and
thus in both worlds—Platonic and Aristotelian—even thinking of a universal (such as “woman”)
requires rationality. The second is that rather than having “maternity” point to a selfless,
fleshless idea to which a woman should conform, it is her body itself which brings motherhood
into being. There is no eternal woman, but there are myriad manifestations of womanhood,
instantiated realities that require flesh and blood ordered to a “universal ratio.” To illustrate this
basic point, Klima points to the first part of the Summa:
The ratio of every single thing is what its name signifies, as the ratio of a stone is that
which its name signifies. But names are the signs of intellectual conceptions, whence the
ratio of any single thing signified by a name is a conception of the intellect that the name
signifies.166
Aquinas shows that there must be a correlation between the thing signified and how the mind
sees it, because, in the words of Klima: “it is precisely the presence of the same ratio in the
object that renders the conception of the intellect true of the object.”167
Despite humans being in the likeness of God through their rationality, God’s understanding is an
entirely different plane of knowledge, for where humans passively receive impressions and then
catalogue them though some system of judgement, God’s knowledge, which extends beyond
himself, is causal, meaning not only that things exist because of being previously—yes,
eternally—known by God, but as John L. Farthing points out, “must be exactly coterminous with
His creative activity and power.”168 So divine ideas do exist as part of God’s causal knowledge,
for as Farthing explains, “things exist in imitation of their archetypes in the mind of God.”169 The
difficulty arises when one suggests that there is one archetype (or form) for each category of
things, which would provide a troubling constraint on God. Farthing continues:
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Hence it is not only being as such whose exemplar exists in the mind of God, but also
beings in their distinction from one another. Consequently, just as there are many
creatures, so are there many exemplars.”170
The breadth of God’s knowing and the right use of species as a category of created things are
combined in a way that allows each creature to be perfected in the most rational way possible.
This summation offered by Daria Spezzano shows the importance of the divine order and how
rational creatures are proportioned to it without losing their essential individuality:
From this act of divine cognition flow the species of all creatures and, in a special way, of
rational creatures. In Thomas’ discussion of the divine knowledge and divine ideas in Ia
qq14-15, he establishes that God’s causal knowledge of everything in the universe in
relation to himself is the source of the universe’s ordered hierarchy; in terms drawn from
q13 it could be said that the universe represents him analogically “as many things are
proportioned to one” [Ia q14 a6 ad3] … God, in perfectly knowing his own essence,
knows also every way in which creatures can participate in it.171
These myriad exemplars give ample room for the range of perfections contingent on the wealth
of souls called to participate in the divine goodness. Stepping firmly away from the solitary and
abstract Platonic ideal, Farthing summarises: “Since God knows by means of ideas (which,
however, are identical with His own essence), there is in God an idea of each thing which He
knows.”172 Moreover, Farthing posits a crucial truth about the particularity of the ideas:
But since no creature imitates the divine essence perfectly, the idea is not the divine
essence in its fullness as essence but is rather understood (by God) according to the
varying degrees of perfection with which different creatures imitate it.173
Essentially, the call to be like God—to exhibit a similitude to his very self—is primarily a call to
love, which is the divine essence. Although each woman is invited to love through motherhood
(which is both physical and spiritual), it is essential to remember that this form of perfection is
inseparable from her hylemorphic composition, and predicated on her individuality. Each
woman’s path, with its unique circumstances—especially the inevitable challenges and
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sufferings—coalesce with the range of choices constantly offered to allow her choose love and
to repent when she fails to love. This cannot conform to a single template, despite the simplicity
of God and his mandate. Given this reality, Spezzano explains how rational creatures in
particular participate in the divine perfections:
God causally knows them as being capable of some degree of participation in his own
self-knowledge and love—in the activities of the divine intellect and will that have God as
their object and the divine essence itself as intelligible species.174
Furthermore, Spezzano shows that this participation is primarily in the intellect through knowing
and willing,175 and thus perfection results when what the subject wills is closest to the divine
idea—not of an abstract idea but a particular and personal idea, as lived in virtuous actions at
every turn. And thus, in light of this thesis, the perfection is achieved through love predicated on
this rational woman’s choice amidst these concrete circumstances,176 for motherhood was
shown above to begin in the intellect, both in the proximate assent and the remote decisions
that pervade around family life.
No doubt reverence for revealed truth guides those who think like von le Fort, but there is no
correlation between submitting to what the Church teaches about motherhood and submitting
one’s embodiment of motherhood to a universal form—for there is no such thing as
disembodied love in the created world. Contrary to von le Fort’s false dichotomy that a woman
must either be herself or a mother, Thomas insists that her perfection hinges on being both!
Moreover it would be absurd to suggest that God prefers the good of the child to the identity of
the mother—for in the case of a daughter, it appears that God would love her for herself only
until she gave birth to another!177 The mother is still a daughter to God, and thus she and her
children coexist simultaneously in his mind as priceless icons of love—each one bearing a
rational soul capable of deeply personal perfection. Unfortunately, in her misguided attempt to
baptize both Goethe and Plato, von le Fort replaced the divine idea of each woman with an
abstract universal, ignoring the fundamental truth that the finite good of motherhood requires an
individual to realize it, a rational mind to embrace it, and a body to bring it about.
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What remains is von le Fort’s sense of mystery surrounding motherhood, and her call for
humility. Both of these are noble, and entirely consistent with the Catholic ideal. One can never
grasp all that is encompassed in the privilege of co-creating a new immortal soul with God (an
act that is collaborative between a man and a woman, and in whose mystery the man partakes
equally!) To return to the concept of munus, there is a vast mission entrusted to the family which
requires tremendous docility to the wisdom of the ages, the teachings of the Church, and the
power of grace to direct and perfect our finite efforts. The beautiful relationship between humility
and the truth magnifies not only our littleness, but must acknowledge the inherent goods in our
creation that God can use for divine ends. Like all virtues, humility guides the appetites, and
consequently must operate “according to right reason”178 in the way mentioned above, the
sensitive submitting to the intellective in what is ultimately an “inward choice of the mind.”179
That said, it must be firmly stated that the leap from humility—recognizing that God can use
finite creatures to accomplish divinely-ordered tasks—to anonymity is unwarranted, and frankly
unCatholic (as the final chapter will show). The Church doesn’t ask its female members to
“submerge [themselves] into the universal stream of succeeding generations;”180 rather the
Church boasts of her faithful members and catalogues them in her canon of saints. Their stories
are proclaimed to the world, primarily by the children who benefitted from their bodily sacrifice
and prudential care amidst particular—concrete—circumstances. Moreover, the very places in
which they flourished are sites of pilgrimage and veneration, as are the exact details of their
witness. Unfortunately, here it becomes evident that the Platonic ideal of anonymity can swerve
precariously close to the stream of Buddhist selflessness, leading to personal dissolution into an
amorphous oversoul. This has nothing to do with the ultimate I-Thou relationship that the triune
God seeks with each of us who bear his image, as filtered through the particularities of
neighbourly love in this life. Any woman might be thoroughly intimidated by pregnancy if she
were to be swallowed by the very munus entrusted to her, but such is not the case—precisely
the opposite is maintained when authentic humility approaches the transcendent mystery.
Thus, in sum, von le Fort’s theory of motherhood ignores the essential truths contingent on
hylemorphism, putting a wedge between body and soul by its attempt to subsume the concrete
experience into a universal idea. Oddly, von le Fort’s reduction of motherhood to its physical
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component--extending at most to the physical demands made postpartum that allow for humble
non-academic service--never engages the highly-rational interpersonal relationship that is
meant to grow as the child develops. Her seeming isolation and elevation of the mother’s
irrational animal soul discourages the mother from a mature application of all her senses-internal and external, leading to a disjointed relationship between intellect and will.
Moreover, fatherhood is ignored in her work altogether. She cannot be a mother without him,
and yet just as a deepening, thoughtful relationship with her children is not considered relevant
to her motherhood, neither is she called into relationship with their father as a requisite for
establishing a stable and loving home--rather his existence seems merely a vague opportunity
for a disembodied submission and further oblation.181 The minute details of these unique and
essential relationships are what constitute, in the words of Klima above, the “multitude, indeed,
a potential infinity of ordinary things.” Persons are not called to abstractions but are known by
their specific characteristics. The divine Mind cannot but know that this woman, having been
embraced by this man, gave birth to this child--and in that knowledge is his will that each of
them respond in multitudinous personal acts of love in imitation of his own deeply personal
love.
Ultimately, von le Fort’s misplaced admiration completes a perfect triad of false approaches to
motherhood that are only possible when a proper hylemorphism is ignored. First, von le Fort
and de Beauvoir both argue that motherhood leads to a loss of subjectivity, the former lauding it,
the latter appalled by it; secondly, Krestova and de Beauvoir agree that motherhood
differentiates men from women, the former lauding it, the latter appalled by it; and thirdly,
Krestova and von le Fort insist on the incommunicability of motherhood, leading the former to
reject rationality as a good, and the latter to reject rationality as a good for women. It is this last
point that is so discouraging as an ideal approved of in some Catholic circles. Beyond ignoring
the distinct rationality shared by all human persons, such a notion actually undermines the very
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imago dei in women, and in particular robs them of rationality in the very gift entrusted to them
for the good of their souls and the benefit of mankind.
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In the sixth month, the angel Gabriel was sent from God to a town of Galilee called
Nazareth, to a virgin betrothed to a man named Joseph, of the house of David, and the
virgin’s name was Mary. And coming to her, he said, “Hail, favored one! The Lord is with
you.” But she was greatly troubled at what was said and pondered what sort of greeting
this might be. Then the angel said to her, “Do not be afraid, Mary, for you have found
favor with God. Behold, you will conceive in your womb and bear a son, and you shall
name him Jesus. He will be great and will be called Son of the Most High, and the Lord
God will give him the throne of David his father, and he will rule over the house of Jacob
forever, and of his kingdom there will be no end.” But Mary said to the angel, “How can
this be, since I have no relations with a man?” And the angel said to her in reply, “The
holy Spirit will come upon you, and the power of the Most High will overshadow you.
Therefore the child to be born will be called holy, the Son of God. And behold, Elizabeth,
your relative, has also conceived a son in her old age, and this is the sixth month for her
who was called barren; for nothing will be impossible for God.” Mary said, “Behold, I am
the handmaid of the Lord. May it be done to me according to your word.” Then the angel
departed from her (Luke 1:26-38).

Chapter Seven: The Maternity of the Blessed Virgin Mary

Before considering how the maternity of Mary, the mother of Jesus Christ, illustrates what is
most rational about motherhood in general, it would be helpful to see how each of our interlocutors understood her. To that end, since each of them attempted to use the circumstances in
the life of the Virgin Mary to further their arguments, this summary will counter those particular
points by showing how the Blessed Mother remained supremely rational in how she lived her
divine motherhood.
Having been raised by a devout Catholic mother and educated in Catholic schools, de Beauvoir
was certainly exposed from an early age to the story of the Virgin Birth, so there is little wonder
that she discusses Mary in her seminal work, The Second Sex. The author begins with the work
of Augustine, whom she believes to have cemented into Christianity the dark view of woman—
first as temptress, and secondly as being more subordinate to her flesh than a man is to his.182
Her maternal nature and her subservience to man combine to map out a path of holiness,183
182
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culminating in her obligation to conceive in a carnal way and deliver the child in pain and
humiliation (the birth canal being so close to the excretory organs).184 Motherhood, as an
unalterable tie to the material world, shackles each woman to a path of degradation and
oppression.
Interestingly, the Church’s suggestion that the Blessed Mother may have avoided both (certainly
sexual intimacy but perhaps also the experience of a normal delivery) Mary threatened to
occupy a place beyond the normal reach—and control—of men.185 Thus, de Beauvoir explains
that the Church, which required Mary as a woman to model a subservient role, were forced to
open her Magnificat186 with a docile acceptance of a “handmaiden’s” position.
For the first time in the history of humanity, the mother kneels before her son; she freely
recognises her inferiority. The supreme masculine victory is consummated in the cult of
Mary: it is the rehabilitation of woman by the achievement of her defeat...Motherhood as
a natural phenomenon confers no power.187
According to de Beauvoir, there is not only a lack of power but a loss of agency, and despite
Mary’s extraordinary place in salvation history, her cult is strictly based on her submissive
nature. Mary, therefore, is simply an effective religious tool used to tie women through childbearing to home and hearth for all generations. De Beauvoir summarizes the Church’s nefarious
plot: “To glorify the mother is to accept birth, life, and death in both their animal and their social
forms and to proclaim the harmony of nature and society.”188
Kristeva, who was born and raised in Bulgaria by an intensely devout father, is not a believer,
but explains that her childhood was “bathed” in the liturgy of the Orthodox Church.189 Where de
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Beauvoir focuses on the Magnificat to understand Mary as a cipher for irrationality, Kristeva
chooses Saint John’s Book of Revelation to illustrate the dichotomy between men and women
regarding rationality. The text she marks out is as follows:
A great sign appeared in the sky, a woman clothed with the sun, with the moon under
her feet, and on her head a crown of twelve stars. She was with child and wailed aloud
in pain as she labored to give birth. ... She gave birth to a son, a male child, destined to
rule all the nations with an iron rod. Her child was caught up to God and his throne. The
woman herself fled into the desert where she had a place prepared by God (Rev 12:1-2,
5-6a).
To explain why the woman fled, Andrea Nye summarises Kristeva’s interpretive logic as follows:
Plato’s sun with its remorseless clarity signifies rational order, the systematic
arrangements of concepts in logical form, or more recently in semantic theory. The
woman can never be the sun but is only covered by it, constrained by it as an alien and
restrictive garment forced on her from above. In the story it is the sun that the woman,
with her feet on the moon, must cast off. Leaving her son, for whom she has laboured to
give birth, to be educated by the authorities above, to be trained in the proper authoritarian modes of knowledge, she must go down to the wilderness to be nourished by the
earth.190
Here we have as clear a division possible between the rationality of men and the otherness of
women, with firm stress laid on how women must flee the rational order for their own good. The
nod to Plato as the source of these forms shows how universal the models are, and Kristeva will
explain at length in her semiotic theory that since even the logic of language excludes women,
and Mary stands as the archetype of the mother whose pregnancy is forever obscured by the
inability to articulate feminine experience. The “loss” of the child to “authoritarian modes of
knowledge” means she and he will never be able to communicate—despite her suffering on his
behalf—for he is a man ontologically unable to understand her earthy existence.
Kristeva takes issue specifically with de Beauvoir’s interpretation of Mary kneeling before her
son (attributed to her study of a painting of the Nativity by Piero della Francesca) in which she
explains that it portrays the defeat of affectivity by intellect. Kristeva believes, rather, that it was
an artistic attempt to “consolidate [a] new cult of humanistic sensitivity” wherein some did
recognise the maternal humility that found joy in such “‘lived’ feminine experience” despite the
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inherent masochism required.191 Kristeva marks Mary’s virginal pregnancy—a key element in a
myth created and embroidered on for centuries—as a pinnacle of the “bipolar structure of
belief,” juxtapositioning logic and love, the word and silence, unity and separation. In this
dichotomy, women falls on the side of affectivity, incommunicability, and isolation—all because
of her maternal capacity.192 To be sure, in order to emphasize the gulf between rational men
and irrational women, Kristeva relies on a very strong [French] translation of Jesus’ words:
“Woman, what is there in common between you and me?” (John 2:3-5),193 but this is necessary
to show that the flesh of Mary is irrelevant to a faith built on an intellectual assent.
Von le Fort, being an ardent Catholic, uses the Virgin Mary as lynchpin and model of her thesis
that pregnancy is mysterious and pre-rational. While taking no issue with the actual life of the
Blessed Mother, von le Fort is quick to point out that she is the sign and model for all people,
men and women, and her Immaculate Conception points to the unfallen ideal.
The passive acceptance inherent in woman, which ancient philosophy regarded as
purely negative, appears in the Christian order of grace the positively decisive factor.
The Marian dogma, reduced to a brief formula, denotes the doctrine of the cooperation
of the creature in the work of redemption.194
Although this cooperation is the model for men and women, maternity is the sign of its
fruitfulness, as she further explains:
The fiat of the Virgin is therefore the revelation of the religious quality in its essence.
Since, as an act of surrender, it is at the same time an expression of essential
womanliness, the latter becomes the manifestation of the religious concept fundamental
to the human being…. She is the power of surrender that is in the cosmos in the form of
the bridal woman.195
While the specific arguments are profoundly different, each woman arrives at the same
conclusion: that the inchoate submission of Mary to the divine plan indicates that her call to bear
Christ required no rational action, and that since she offers so few words in the Gospel
accounts, one is obliged to extract from her actions (for example, submission to the Angel, her
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flight into the desert, her adoration of the Christ-child) the reality of her situation. De Beauvoir
adds to the tale the manipulation of the message by men, which Kristeva affirms because the
patriarchal Church’s insistence on the alienating use of language, which destroys the essential
mystery.
The Annunciation
The most important aspect of the account of the Annunciation (above) is that it is a
conversation. There is a greeting, a proposal, a discussion, and an assent, and Aquinas notes
how remarkable even the greeting is:
With respect to the first, it should be known that in ancient times it was an especially
great event when an angel appeared to men, so that men might show them reverence,
for they deserve the greatest praise. It was written in praise of Abraham that he received
angels hospitably and that he showed them reverence. But it was never heard that an
angel showed reverence to a man until he saluted the blessed virgin, saying reverently,
Hail.196
While often this salutation is passed over as a normal opening to any rational exchange,
Thomas shows that it reveals a singularity in Mary that surpasses Abraham himself, showing
that she was worthy of a uncommon courtesy from a divine messenger.
Next, Aquinas looks at the rationality of the rest of the event, which illustrates not only all that
has been said thus far about the human person as a hylemorphic being, but particularly the
hierarchy whereby the body is created for the soul as its instrument, with the actions it takes
being subject to the intellect and will. He explains:
It was reasonable that it should be announced to the Blessed Virgin that she was to
conceive Christ. First, in order to maintain a becoming order in the union of the Son of
God with the Virgin—namely, that she should be informed in mind concerning Him,
before conceiving Him in the flesh. Thus Augustine says (De Sancta Virgin. iii): “Mary is
more blessed in receiving the faith of Christ, than in conceiving the flesh of Christ;” and
further on he adds: “Her nearness as a Mother would have been of no profit to Mary, had
she not borne Christ in her heart after a more blessed manner than in her flesh.”197
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Thus, despite Augustine’s purported dark view of women, Thomas relies on him for a profound
understanding of the Annunciation as one portion of the greater munus of pregnancy, reiterating
in his own way that no action is isolated, but first intricately tied to what comes before and after,
and second that the body is proportioned to the soul that directs it—and together they are
invited to respond to the will of God. Whatever accuracies or inaccuracies may have existed in
Thomas’ biological understanding of the reproductive powers,198 the essential point is that after
clarifying the mission through a verbal exchange, Mary offered the “free gift of her obedience”
culminating in her fiat (“Let it be…”). The Incarnation hinged on her intellective consent, proving
that reason, in the highest sense of the word, guided her action.
De Beauvoir’s insistence that there was no agency on the part of Mary reveals that she
confuses voluntary submission with mandatory submission, an idea unfortunately shared by
many. Muslims share the same benighted view because of the Quranic version of the same
event, wherein the angel tells Mary:
“Creating a son without a father is an easy matter to Allâh. Allâh will make your son a
sign to mankind and mercy and a blessing to those who believe in and follow him.
Creating him is a matter that Allah has decreed; so it will not be blocked or changed.”199
Here Mary’s free will assent is neither requested nor required before the virginal conception of
her son, for she (like all) must submit [islām] to the unalterable will of a voluntarist god. While at
first glance, it may appear that the net result is the same, the Christian understanding of the
Annunciation explicitly reveals Mary’s free agency in the encounter, and her rational nature—
key to the imago dei that all persons bear—requires that it be so.
Moreover, given that subsequent events were the result of her response given to the angel, the
language she used (both in hearing and speaking) were entirely adequate to accomplish the
task, so that she could assent to a mission that would unfold in time. Kristeva’s explanation
(based on the Book of Revelation) that she fled the world of male dominated language is
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another flight of fancy that has little to do with the Gospel. Christ, “the Word made flesh,” was
indeed entrusted to Mary to guide for his formative years, which she did with the help of Joseph
in the bosom of the larger community where they lived—first in Egypt, and later in Nazareth.
Such was the expansive munus that allowed God to walk among his creatures, after having
learned to speak at Mary’s feet.
To expand further on Augustine’s explanation that Mary’s mental conception of the Incarnation
preceded the physical event, the Carmelite Alexander Vella gathers together other points made
in the Gospel of Luke that amplify this reality. He points out that Mary’s cousin, Elizabeth, after
reverencing the extraordinary events related to the unborn Lord, “praises her for believing the
word that was spoken to her.”200 He threads this passage together with the parable of the
Sower, in light of Jesus’ response to an announcement family members had arrived to see him:
“My mother and my brothers are those who hear the word of God and do it” (Luke 8: 21).
Mary and the other relatives of Jesus are here put forward as examples of the seed that
fell on good soil. Jesus insists again on this when, as Luke narrates in 11:27-28, a
woman in the crowd praised his mother. In replying, Jesus pointed out that true
blessedness lies not in his mother’s physical relationship with him, but rather in her
hearing God's word and obeying it.
Von le Fort’s admiration for Mary’s “passive acceptance” stretches her submission too far, as
though Mary were floating placidly along a lazy river. Vella points out that Luke’s infancy
narrative illustrates two encounters that caused Mary to reflect deeply on their meaning: “After
the shepherds’ visit, he says that ‘Mary kept all these words and pondered them in her heart’
(2:19), and after the finding of Jesus in the temple, at the very end of the infancy narrative, Luke
notes, ‘His mother retained all these things in her heart’ (2:51).”201 The verb “ponder” is no
passive endeavor, as Vella shows:
So Luke pictures Mary keeping in mind words and deeds relating to the mission of Jesus
and pointing to his future. It is clearly not just remembrance, the keeping in mind of
recollections from Jesus' infancy to treasure them nostalgically. It is keeping in mind
mysterious words, strange deeds and trying to figure out their significance. This is
precisely the meaning of the Greek verb that we translate as "ponder". It is synballein in
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Greek, a compound word made up of syn, meaning “with,” and ballein, meaning “to
throw.” Synballein then, from which our word “symbol” derives, means to throw together,
to put together, to combine various things.202
What von le Fort calls passivity would far better be termed receptivity, which allows for a fully
human response to a challenging proposal. Receptivity gives room to manoeuvre along the
lines of what Dionysius called “mental discussion.”203 This process incorporates words, both
those spoken to Mary at given times and the Hebrew Scriptures with which she was abundantly
familiar, and yet it also draws on those subtle sensory impressions, the phantasms that feed the
intellect, no doubt including non-verbal cues and other abstract data that had to be
incorporated—thrown together!—in order to enrich and complete the complex intellective
process. Receptivity explains the give-and-take that is possible among thinking persons, and
more fully reflects the embodied interiority that led to Mary’s fiat—a response that could be
revisited and renewed as the consequences unfolded over the years.
All said, Mary’s maternity cannot be used to illustrate any of the three theses concerning the
irrationality of pregnancy, rather she proves the exact opposite. The Biblical account, contrary to
Kristeva’s charge of emitting “bipolar” images, shows rather that her free will was an essential
component, and that her mind kept working as concrete events unfolded. Her use of language
may have been minimal (we cannot know) but it was pivotal to Mary’s rational engagement with
God’s salvific plan—even if much of it remains profoundly mysterious. If there is one point that is
to be retained in faith, it is von le Fort’s supposition that “the Marian dogma, reduced to a brief
formula, denotes the doctrine of the cooperation of the creature in the work of redemption,”204
but this cooperation, properly understood, entails a freely offered submission of mind and heart
to an intelligible God. Such was the nature of the profoundly personal encounter through which
a rational woman was invited to collaborate in the divine munus, and by which she responded
first intellectually—setting in motion the reditus integral to restoring order in creation—before the
Word took flesh in her womb.
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“Since the person, an intellectual substance, is a part of the universe in whom the
perfection of the whole universe can exist according to knowledge, his most proper good
as intellectual substance will be the good of the universe, which is an essentially
common good. Rational creatures, persons, are distinguished from irrational, by being
more ordered to the common good and by being able to act expressly for its sake” (J.M.
Cardinal Villeneuve, OMI).205

Chapter Eight: Pregnancy and the Common Good
In sum, many philosophical and theological influences have coalesced to marginalize the gifts of
women over the millennia, due in large part to a misunderstanding of the true nature of their
reproductive capacity.206 The widespread assumption—based on a plethora of arguments—that
the material demands of pregnancy serve to distract women from rational tasks has drawn a
variety of responses, ranging from rejecting motherhood as a good to rejecting rationality as a
good, and yet few have stopped to consider the ways in which motherhood itself is rational.
These ways have been outlined above, with stress laid on the hylemorphic nature of the human
person, the fact that human inclinations incline to the good, and that the ratio of this good is our
perfection. Thus, rationality encompasses the entire person, ordering his appetites and directing
his inclinations with prudence. The body is proportioned to the soul that directs these
inclinations, and virtue assures that even the lowest of natural functions can participate in the
highest of rational endeavors, contributing to the perfection of the person.
The premise of this work has never been to assume that all women are called to physical
motherhood, nor even that any particular woman would be better served by having children. The
purpose is merely to reveal the rationality of maternity. It is in this light that the Scriptural
passages “be fruitful and multiply” and “she will be saved through motherhood” combine to show
that the Christian reverence for motherhood is consistent with its inherent respect for the free
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will component in salvation. One last argument will show how that maternity is not only a form of
personal perfection but one that is effusive, radiating to enhance the common good.
To revisit Pinckaers’ five natural inclinations, those he calls “primitive spiritual instincts,”207 it is
now appropriate to consider the last, the inclination to live in a society. The inquiry that remains
is threefold: to consider maternity as a private good versus a public good, to show how pursuing
the common good adds to the perfection of the mother herself, and to gauge the impact of a
fully rational maternity on the perfection of the wider community. These are obviously closely
related, but it is possible to pull out the threads to find particular answers, especially as they
relate to human rationality.
Human persons have always collaborated in society, not only on the material level, but also to
share ideas and experiences.208 Because of their rationality, which inherently inclines humans to
form meaningful relationships, there is also the universal desire for a friendship, for “friendship,
like virtue, clearly transcends the order of material usefulness.”209 Proper friendships are integral
to a healthy society, and should be at the heart of family life itself. This was indicated above
when Gondreau outlined that marriage has “two proximate and complementary ends: the
procreative (expressive of the body) and the unitive (expressive of the soul).”210 Pinckaers
stresses that these two ends should never be rivals: “They should be joined and bonded. The
principal end, especially the education of the children, cannot be attained without the mutual
cooperation of the spouses, their friendship, and affection.”211 Thomas encouraged friendship
within marriage,212 and its witness to each subsequent generation will foster growth in maturity
on the personal level, and facilitate a proper use of freedom in the larger sphere.
In this regard, when a husband and wife cooperate enthusiastically on a variety of levels for the
good of their offspring, it means that they have accepted the premise that a healthy family is a
207
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rational good. The munus as they understand it has allowed the parents to lay the foundation in
friendship and to pursue a sequence of rational tasks that will benefit their children. And yet,
while it was shown above that maternity is never completely isolated, even a close-knit family
that looks responsibly after the myriad needs of its many members might still be, on one level,
pursuing a private good, relatively speaking.
Benjamin Smith, after studying the work of Charles de Koninck, summarizes the difference
between public and private goods according to Aquinas:
Thomas compares and distinguishes individual and common goods in a variety of ways.
The common good is communicable, whereas the individual good is incommunicable;
that is, the individual good is not the kind of good that can be shared. It is private and
exclusive. My health is my health and it cannot be directly shared by anyone else; it is
not the health of another. To be sure, my health may indirectly contribute to the good of
another, but only by occasioning a different perfection. It directly perfects me and no
else.213
Thus, it is possible that the virtues exercised within the family might be pursued for the good of
the family alone, as though their perfection might be achieved on their own terms. What de
Koninck first stresses is that, ideally, the good of each layer of society—extended family,
neighbours, and state as well—should not be in conflict. In all honesty, there is often a deep
apprehension over competing goods, and one discerns an immediate dichotomy between family
and stranger, between the manageable and the unwieldy, and between the known and the
unknown, and thus, according to de Koninck, the first obstacle to overcome in pondering the
world beyond the family is fear that the common good is an alien good (bonum alienum).214 Just
as the body and the soul are not rivals, but fitted to work collaboratively, neither is the authentic
personal good of one person—or of one family—unrelated to the good of those elements of
society that must be shared to some degree.
Within the range of all created things, authentic goods all participate to some degree in the
same eternal good, which is God. It is when the parents are able to let go of an exclusive view
of their family’s interest and weigh their thoughts and actions regarding the other members of
the community that the good within the family becomes communicable. When they realize that
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each decision has myriad consequences for their neighbours and act accordingly, they will have
crossed the threshold into seeing their family as a public good. The Gospel is filled with
guidance on this topic, culminating with Jesus’ encounter with a scholar of the Law:
“Teacher, which commandment in the law is the greatest?” [Jesus] said to him,* “You
shall love the Lord, your God, with all your heart, with all your soul, and with all your
mind. This is the greatest and the first commandment. The second is like it: You shall
love your neighbor as yourself. The whole law and the prophets depend on these two
commandments” (Matthew 22:36-40).
There is a second obstacle that needs to be overcome in order to incorporate this vision in its
truest sense, for it is still possible to consider the good of the other in an imperfect way. For
example, a mother can work diligently, not only to see that her child is well-prepared for school
but that his classmates have what they need as well, and yet even this isn’t necessarily the
highest good, given the misplaced object of her hard work. As Benjamin Smith explains:
“the good common to many taken separately is common in the sense that it is multiplied
among many. This is not really and truly a common good, but an individual good made
common by division into many individual instances. The hallmark of the common good
by predication is division and multiplication; the hallmark of the common good by
causality is unity.”215
To continue with the illustration, the mother—with great exertion—may extend herself in the
predominantly material task of seeing that each child has books, lunch money, and ample
access to opportunities. The higher challenge is to actually foster unity, seeing beyond a
conglomeration of individual goods to a shared, communal good—so that a communion at the
deepest level is forged among those who live and work together, not only here on earth, but
eternally as well.
This is surely overwhelming to anyone—especially a young, exhausted and overwhelmed new
mother! God knows this, but as Janet Smith points out, this is a “free and responsible
participation in Christ’s mission and a recognition that the invitation to participate in that mission
is a gift that entails ennobling responsibilities.”216 Johnston also ties it together, noting:
Just as man is animal and rational, so marriage is rooted in biology (in procreation) yet
reaches far beyond (in education). Marriage is a complete relationship, a relationship of
215
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equity, friendship, love, and the common good, a relationship that reaches beyond
merely material provision into the most social concerns of human life.217
It is no accident that the word munus, heretofore associated with the task of motherhood, is the
same word used throughout the Church’s history to explain God’s invitation to collaborate with
him for the good of all. Janet Smith points to one telling example in an encyclical on the Holy
Spirit, entitled Divinum Illud Munus, written by Pope Leo XIII, the title meaning “That Divine Gift
(or Office).” In it he explains that munus in the title refers to “the munus of bringing men to
salvation, which Christ received from His Father and which He transmitted for completion to the
Holy Spirit.” Smith continues:
He also mentions that the Holy Spirit is invoked in the liturgy as the Giver of Gifts (Dator
Munerum). The sense of gift, then, is deeply embedded in the Church’s use of the word
munus, which also carries some sense of giftedness by the Spirit.218
Here, then we come full circle, in recognizing that the munus of motherhood itself is a gift, and
one that not only points the recipient back to the giver, but is given with full access to the help of
the Giver to make that return possible—not only for herself but others as well. This is but one
rich manifestation of the exitus-reditus process, which incorporates the free will of the subject to
embrace the freely given grace of God to engage in a process of purification. This has been
evident to Thomas all along, as Benjamin Smith points out:
In the Prima secundae, Thomas distinguishes the real common good in just this fashion.
In question 90, article 2, he famously argues that all law is ordered to the common good
rather than the individual good. In the corpus of the article, he says that because law
belongs to practical reason, it must be ordered to happiness, the first principle of
practical reason. This conclusion is clear enough, but he immediately goes on to argue
that law is ordered not to happiness taken individually, but to the happiness of the whole
community, which as we shall see essentially consists of virtuous cooperation.219
It is precisely in this virtuous cooperation that a woman is perfected, and pregnancy is a singular
way of seeking her own good while contributing to the good of others. In this regard, Benjamin
Smith summarizes De Koninck’s view of the common good:
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The common good is not the aggregate or sum of individual goods. An aggregate of
individual goods is not really one but simply the adding up of many really different
individual goods. By contrast the real common good is one in number and genuinely
shared by many. As such it is external to any individual person; it is genuinely the
common good of the whole rather than the individual good of the part. It is a shared
purpose that unites and perfects the many who pursue it.”220
To distinguish the particular threads as indicated above, it is not just that the family benefits
when the mother works on behalf of their private good, and it is not just that the wider
community benefits when she extends herself beyond the family on behalf of communicable
goods, it is actually her perfection itself that redounds to their perfection. As De Koninck
explains: “Thus one sees that the more a being is perfect, the more it implies relation to the
common good, and the more it acts principally for this good which not only in itself but also for
the being which acts for it is the greatest.221
Here, ultimately, we find the most extraordinary truth about the human person, that the higher
the end for which she acts, the more rational the action. Contrary to the three diverse arguments
that pregnancy is irrational, it is one of the highest rational actions of which humans are
capable, for it has the potential to touch and perfect a wide number of persons, which in
essence means that it is a way of deepening the very rationality of the wider sphere. Rather
than being incommunicable or subpersonal, it is a mechanism for fostering communication—not
only among persons, but also between God and those creatures in his divine image. And rather
than demanding that the mother be subsumed by the task, she is asked to use her natural
powers for a supernatural end—demanding not dissolution of subjectivity in creatures but a
profoundly personal encounter among beloved souls.
This is what embodied interiority was meant to be—a means of unity that perfects all that it
touches. A mother’s collaborative contribution to the common good, when guided by her rational
embrace of the One who gave her the gift, enhances God’s own task of unifying souls, as De
Koninck explains: "Whence it follows that the good, which has the notion of a final cause, is so
much the more efficacious as it communicates itself to more numerous beings.”222 Here,
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Aristotle’s “cause of causes” is revealed to be God, giver of the capacity for motherhood, which
is most rationally actualized within marriage, where one finds, according to Gondreau “the
deepest bonds of personal communion and friendship.”223 Motherhood so lived, expresses true
teleological liberty—one that radiates rationality and perfection wherever it is found.
Finally, despite the diverse misunderstandings of Mary’s motherhood, illustrated above, the
Virgin Mary is the most rational of women, specifically through her motherhood. De Koninck
reflects on the longstanding Church teaching that her holy life is mirrored in the Scriptural text
on wisdom, which includes this portion:
For she is an aura of the might of God
and a pure effusion of the glory of the Almighty;
therefore nought that is sullied enters into her. . . .
And she, who is one, can do all things,
and renews everything while herself perduring;
And passing into holy souls from age to age,
she produces friends of God and prophets” (Wis 7:25, 27).
In sum, De Koninck posits that Mary’s utterly free assent to the invitation to bear the Divine
Child allowed her to be “at once an emanation and an indwelling” of divine wisdom, for her
collaboration with God radiated a perfection that benefitted the entire created order.224 And
given that Aquinas affirmed that “wisdom is the highest perfection of reason,” (I Ethic., Iect. 1), it
has been conclusively shown that maternity is perfectly rational.
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